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Abstract
This anthropological study aims to understand the role of activists in the day to
day operation of the rights based policy, the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural
Employment Guarantee Act (MNREGA), in India. MNREGA promises 100 days of
employment to each household that makes a demand for such employment, providing an
employment safety net for the large population of the Indian rural poor. Historically,
government and local corruption in official and unofficial policy implementation
structures have interfered with the efficiency of social relief and reform initiatives in
India. Such systems of operation also impact the functioning of MNREGA. However,
unlike previous initiatives to provide relief and support to the poor, MNREGA of the
state of Andhra Pradesh has been able to achieve a level of success not witnessed before
in the country. Such success has complexity in its origin, derived from cultural
phenomena, historical events, and changing economic and political environments. All
such factors contribute to the integral role of activists in the operation of the program
within patronage bound village society. Thus, my research explores the role of activists in
Andhra Pradesh, and their intermediary role in the claim to rights and citizenship by the
rural poor.
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Prologue
I arrive to a village meeting in the village of Chammochintha in my early days of
fieldwork, accompanied by activists Ram Lakshmi, who I call Ram, and Sunil. A small group of
men have assembled at the small community center located by the village main road. Jagraj,
Sivaraj, Aparao, Nagaraj, and Chinappa have settled on the porch of the center and are chatting.
All of them participate in the government employment program MNREGA. Ram, Sunil, and I sit
with them and chat about life and their families. As we speak, more people join the conversation.
The discussion has turned to the matter of receiving work and payment through the employment
program.
The program promises work when the workers demand it. Such work requests are
generally responded to. Sometimes it may take some time for groups to receive work they
request. At this time the villagers have not received work for a month. They tell me that wage
payments are delayed and take about a month to reach the workers. They correctly explain to me
that they should be receiving these payments within 15 days. Sunil and Ram sit and listen to this
common tale of government shortcomings.
I then ask what workers do when these sort of problems arise. They say they should
generally issue a complaint to the local program officer, the field assistant (FA), then they should
take the complaint to the local government office. Instead, they usually take the complaint to a
member of APVVU, a local activist organization, or to Sunil, a local APVVU activist. An
inquiry into the situation will then be placed. When I asked what the villagers would do if no
change was seen after doing this, they responded saying what more could they do, at least they
were being paid something.
The workers comment on an issue of not being paid the same amounts of money for
doing what they perceive as equivalent amounts of work. The payment system in this area is
3

dependent on the amount of work completed, not the amount of time someone works. According
to a woman attending this meeting, some workers are being paid 900 Rs, while others maybe
receive 400 Rs for what they perceive is the same amount of work. Other members of the village
agree with her concern. Raju, an outspoken local youth and NREGA participant, vocalized his
concerns by showing his family’s job card and the 197 Rs. he received for 3 days of work. He
feels that this payment is far below the minimum wage for the amount of work he had
completed. When the workers brought this disparity up to the FA they were told to redistribute
the amounts amongst their groups. It is also difficult for them to prove such a disparity in
payments without the payment slips to tell them how much payment each should be receiving.
This is another problem they have been encountering. Workers should be receiving
payment slips providing the information about how much they will be paid and how much work
they finished, as well as the dates of work they are receiving payment for. They can then take
this slip to the post office to claim the money they have earned. Without these slips there is little
understanding of how much work each worker is being paid for. There is some disagreement
amongst the group as to why they are no longer receiving the slips. Some say that the post office
is not even requesting the slips from workers so the FA and the post office no longer see the need
for the slips. Others say that the FA has the slips and is not giving them out for some reason.
I ask why the people are not demanding that they be given the slips, especially when they
see the slips as so important. Raju steps into the discussion saying that “they” have no slips to
give. I assume the “they” he is referring to is local bureaucracy and the FA. Ram again jumps in
and saying that is a bad reason to not demand. She believes that if a demand is made then the FA
will be forced to demand that the slips be printed and given so she can hand them out. “If the
child is hungry they should they ask their parents for food and their parent will give it to them”,
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she says in a metaphor in which the parents are local government and the hungry child is the
workers. Raju responds saying that what she is saying is true, but in this situation the parent has
no food (the payment slips). His theory is that the local NREGA office is not generating the slips
so the FA does not have them and is not able to give them. The post office also does not ask for
the slips so the people are not demanding the slips.
The villagers discuss some benefits the program has provided them, by the request of
Ram. According to them, the program has reduced the amount of migrant workers in this village.
Prior to the program many people would go to the East and West Godavari region to find work
that was largely agriculture based. This did not pay well, and people were unsatisfied with
distance they had to migrate for work, and the length of time they had to be away from family
and friends. After NREGA people largely stopped migrating and began working through the
program. The money they are getting from participating in the program is allowing them to send
their children to school, pay off loans they may have needed to take, and take care of their family
and themselves.
Soon however, the conversation returned to the problems they see with the program. Raju
pushes the conversation back into this direction saying he feels that no one sees it as his or her
duty to go demand for their rights on their own. They often see that someone else will do it.
Additionally, they see the time it takes to make such demands as time they could have made
money. The villagers have participated in protests and marches organized through APVVU. Raju
exclaims, “We do all this but nothing happens. There are still problems!”. Ram jumps into the
conversation and begins arguing with Raju. She reminds him that because of such protests they
began receiving payment when they were not before. They were also receiving payment slips for
some time after demands were made. Ram also says that if people are not receiving proper
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payment they should make demands. Since this payment system is based on how much work is
actually done, workers have physical evidence of how much work was completed (for example,
the size of the hole they dug that day). She says that the people have the power to speak up and
take the FA to go see the work they completed and demand for the proper payment. APVVU has
even given them the measuring tape, calculator, and training for them to measure and calculate
the amount of money they are entitled too. Others say that they recognize the power of demand,
but they are unable to make such demands themselves. One woman asks, “Who has that much
bravery?” At this point, an older man, Nokaraj speaks up and says that not demanding does
shows that the continuation of problems is also their fault. He understands that the workers need
to speak up for themselves. For now, they turn to activists like Sunil and Ram to help them
vocalize and demand.
The problems faced by these NREGA workers are common, as is their general hesitation
towards making demands for their entitlements and rights from local bureaucracy. However,
unlike many villages in India, this village has frequent interactions with activists who are able to
hear and organize action in an effort to solve problems encountered by the villagers. There is
significance of such interactions between activist and villagers, having possible larger
application to rights-based policy implementation in India, as well as the potential to reveal
insight on rights in postcolonial rural India.

6

Chapter 1: Introduction
The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MNREGA), also
known as the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA), is the world’s largest
poverty alleviation and public employment program. NREGA is also arguably the world’s most
revolutionary rights-based development legislation, based on the principle that basic livelihood
provisions are a fundamental human right. Such rights-based legislation, propose an assertion of
rights by the marginalized poor. Whether or not this purpose is actualized requires study. In
addition to the ambitious goal of this legislation, the sheer scale by which the program can affect
the massive population of India’s poor further warrants research on NREGA.
Additionally, the role of activists in creating awareness, organization, day to day
operation of NREGA, as well as in combating corruption draws into question what role such
activists have in the claim to rights and citizenship of marginalized villagers receiving work
through NREGA. The failures of such rights-based policy go deeper than the “corruption” policy
makers had considered, and may be due to a disjunction between ideas of universal rights and
citizenship conveyed in policy and the cultural context of the village. This research was
conducted in the context of the state of Andhra Pradesh (AP), known for its high levels of
NREGA success compared to other Indian states. I also had the added benefit of being fluent in
Telugu, the regional language of AP.
The success of NREGA within AP have been partly based on the extensive role of
activists in both the implementation of NREGA and its daily operation. Activists have had
significant influence in empowering and inspiring grassroots movements crucial for the creation
of development policy such as NREGA, as well as the successful implementation of the
program. In fact, these activists spearheaded the right to work campaign that culminated in
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NREGA. While there is a great deal of research on this program, the role of rights-based activists
has received little attention. This thesis will examine the role of activists in the everyday practice
of NREGA. I will explore how such activism affects this concept of the “right to work”. NREGA
is merely one case of such rights-based policy, but such a study can provide important insights
about the nature of citizenship in post-colonial India and the role of activists in this
contemporary context. It can also contribute useful insight for use in other rights-based policy.
1.1

Rights-Based Development
The rights based development framework is one that aims to achieve social

transformation between various actors typically involved in economic development efforts. In
the context of India, this is between those involved with the implementation of rights, and the
rights holders, or those claiming their rights. It is rights-based development that stresses the need
for rights holders to exercise substantial citizenship by making claims to rights. The practice of
rights-based development aims to make a connection between human rights and economic
development, to strengthen the development capacity of the country and empower the rights
holders, in this case marginalized citizens. The empowering and transformative potential of
rights-based development makes it attractive to activists who see it as a vehicle by which to
alleviate symptoms of poverty and reduce the prevalence of poverty, but also as a larger way to
extend citizenship to the marginalized and socially oppressed.
The modern conception of human rights began in 1948, with the signing of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Created in the shadow of World War II and the Jewish
Holocaust, the UDHR was doctored by U.S. diplomats and international delegates of the United
Nations (UN). This international organization, the UN, was founded three years prior and created
the UDHR as one of its founding documents (Tate, 2007). This declaration lays out in thirty
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articles the universal minimal standards of humanity; the “inherent dignity and the equal and
inalienable rights of all members of the human family” (The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, 1948). International pressures exerted from the UN rights framework functioned to
pressurize and commit governments to providing the institutional framework to protect social
arrangements of human rights (Molyneux and Lazar, 2003).
The 1990’s marked a rise of discussion regarding a new form of development, rightsbased development. An increased renewal of confidence in liberal values arose from the end of
the Cold War, democratic governments were restored in Latin America, and the former Soviet
Union, and an international human rights movement was revitalized by the 1993 UN Conference
on Human Rights. A new consensus in political arenas was formed over the importance of
integrating issues of rights and democracy into development practices, giving rise to an era of
rights-based development (Molyneux and Lazar, 2003). Poverty alleviation and development
was formerly addressed through more universal welfare principles with a greater emphasis on
helping people meet basic needs, using a needs-based framework. Whereas, the rights-based
framework places emphasis on empowerment of the poor, allowing the poor to demand and
assert their rights from the state, the needs-based framework largely paternalistic in nature, with
the state providing welfare rather than rights. There are inherent philosophical differences
between the rights and needs-based framework. Unlike any needs-based policy, rights-based
policy is able to create a platform for conversation between citizen and state, allowing the poor
to make demands to rights (Nelson and Dorsey, 2003; Jayal, 2013). The shift in the 1990’s
marked the emergence of a global consensus that basic livelihood provisions are fundamental
human rights.

9

During this time of UN influence, economist Amartya Sen’s theorized the capacity
approach, explaining that development should be evaluated by the capacity of individuals to
fulfill rights-based capacity indicators (Sen, 1993). He created one of the first, and highly
influential link between rights and development. His work influenced the acknowledgment of
this link between rights and development by the United Nations (UN). This framework was
further recognized by the UN with the release of UNDP Human Development Report of 2000
stating that, “capabilities and human rights [are] ends and means of escaping poverty…Human
rights have intrinsic value as ends in themselves. They also have instrumental value” (UNDP,
2000: 74). International pressures influenced a few countries and NGOs to shift to a more rightsbased development framework, India and South Africa at the forefront of this change.
Right-based development efforts had the added benefit of addressing differences in
power within society, supporting individuals previously unable to make claims to rights to make
such claims within oppressive social climates. Such imbalances among populations have the
capabilities of inspiring movements for equality. Rights provided a strategic way of addressing
such imbalances between the elite and the marginalized. “Rights form a valuable strategic entry
point for addressing the ways in which power imbalances act to deny the marginalized access to
assets and opportunities necessary for a secure and sustainable livelihood” (Moser et al., 2001).
Claims of human rights were seen a method of including claims to personhood, supported by
national law as a citizen, or to international law as a subject of human rights, as a human being.
John Gledhill points out, “practical denial of rights can only be justified by postulating essential
differences that reduce the claims to humanity of those against whom one discriminates”
(Gledhill, 1997). Rights offered a possible way to rebalance power relations, allowing those
previously without power to demand from the powerful. “The construction of rights implies the
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rebalance of power relations and a horizon of justice” (Corrêa, 1997). Unlike previous
approaches to poverty alleviation, the rights-based approach explicitly places such power
relations at the center of addressing poverty (Piron, 2005). The international support of universal
rights fueled social movements to claim newly legitimized entitlements, for which the only
requirement was to be human.
Anthropologist James Ferguson draws to attention another philosophical shift in the
adoption of the rights-based framework by governments. Ferguson claims that the root cause of
poverty is political. Mainstream development discourse “de-politicizes” development, rendering
it a technical issue. Rather, the rights framework succeeds in re-politicizing poverty by
empowering people as a means to end poverty (Ferguson, 1990). Thus, there is a certain power
to rights-based policy that previous need-based policy failed to provide. The right-based
framework has the ability to combat power imbalances, increase claims to rights and citizenship,
as well as increase claims to international definitions of humanity. Prominent development
researchers Drèze and Khera comment on this ability of rights-based policy. Marginalized people
typically have reduced access to economic rights due to the involvement of local elites. By
providing access to economic rights that elites will certainly oppose, such laws can theoretically
catalyze collective action from the marginalized and prompt social transformation (Drèze and
Khera, 2011).
Such power dynamics are intrinsic to everyday village life. Therefore, the push of rightsbased development and policy by the Indian government, inspired by international definitions of
human rights, inherently contradicted village norms of such power dynamics and social
hierarchy, with the expectation that the marginalized would be able to demand and exercise
rights. The transformative potential of rights-based policy to extend substantive citizenship to the

11

marginalized and oppressed was the incentive for activists who led movements for such rightsbased legislation. Activists understood that social transformation first required the appropriate
supporting rights-based legislation as a catalyst of change. There was a long road to such rightsbased legislation involving dedication and pressure by various governmental and nongovernmental forces.
1.2

History of Rights and Rights Based Legislation in India
The pressure exerted by non-governmental forces in India was crucial to the creation of

new legislation in the rights-based framework. This pressure by activists and activist
organizations was largely placed during various social movements, the most influential of which
were the right to food movement, and the following revolutionary right to information
movement.
Social movements primarily take the form of a non-institutionalized collective social
action striving for political and/or social change (Shah, 1990). The concept of a social movement
itself has many definitions, but after review of definitions proposed by various social movement
theorists such as Rudolf Heberle (1951), Neil Smelser (1963), John Wilson (1973), and Paul
Wilkinson (1971), it is commonly agreed that social movements have a commitment to change.
The purpose of its organization generally being the overall commitment to the movement’s aims
and/or beliefs with the active participation of the followers or members of the movement (Shah,
1990).
To clarify further the definition of social movement, we can look to Andre Gunder Frank
and Marta Fuentes who address the confusion surrounding the difference between social
movements and political movements (Frank and Fuentes, 1987). They explain that social
movements do not strive for state power, rather the objective of social movements can be seen as
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that of social transformation. As Ghanshyam Shah writes, “the participants get mobilized for
attaining social justice”. The social movement associated with rights based policy in India and
NREGA supports this definition. Here, similar to other social movements, social transformation
is supported by political transformation with the creation of new legislation. This movement
resulted in a mix of activism with the judicial activism of the Indian Supreme Court and the reevaluation of the constitution, the political activism associated with such re-evaluation of the
constitution and creation of new legislation, and an overall ambition of social transformation
linked with the transformative potential of rights-based activism. Despite having classic
characteristics of a social movement, the involvement of activists associated with this social
movement and NREGA differ from typical preconceptions of social movements as activists have
extensive involvement in the day-to-day implementation of the program. The movement
exemplifies how the goals of political and social change have largely become intertwined. The
call for change in one demanding of the other. The fight for the claiming of political rights
supporting a related claim on humanity.
Prior to the introduction of various rights-based policy in Indian legislation, a remarkable
shift in judicial thought occurred in a rights revolution. During this time the Supreme Court reevaluated rights that were constitutionally supported. The rights Indian citizens were promised
according to the constitution are separated as “fundamental rights” and “directive principles”.
The two categories differ in the types of rights they support and associated legality of those
rights. Fundamental rights secure civil and political rights, while directive principles support
social and economic rights. Unlike the fundamental principles, directive principles are not legally
enforceable. Instead, they were created with the intention of providing guidelines for law
making. In the 2000s, Supreme Court began reading economic rights into Article 21 of the
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Indian constitution, which promises the right to life. This began blending the previously nonlegally enforceable directive principles, and the legally enforceable fundamental rights together.
The judicial activism that allowed for this significant move was crucial to the creation of such
rights-based policy as NREGA. Introduction of such rights policy was the result of such
governmental involvement, as well as the non-governmental involvement of activists and various
activist groups.
1.2.1 Right to Food
Successes of social action and activist-led movements have been an enduring feature of
India’s history. Sometimes these groups act as the agents of social transformation and other
times they act as the pressurizing groups (Unia, 1991). In recent history, activists have succeeded
in compelling the legislation of rights-based policies. One success has been the implementation
of the Midday Meal Scheme. The Scheme was enacted by the government in 2001, and was
formed with the purpose of providing Indian school children with free lunch each day. The
scheme itself is based on the concept that every citizen has the right to food. Beyond the
immediate impact such an act can have on hunger and nutrition, the scheme also provides a
strong incentive for parents to send their children to school. The law itself would not have been
implemented without the intervention of an activist organization a part of a larger campaign
called “Right to Food”. In the beginning of 2000, the group began to pressurize courts to form a
law that intervened in hunger related matters. The People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) in
Rajasthan initiated the “Right to Food Litigation” demanding that school meals be provided in
government schools throughout the whole of India. Mobilizing action through a petition and
Public Interest Litigation (PIL) resulted in the restructuring of a largely unsuccessful version of
the Midday Meal Scheme from 1995. Here we see the role social action groups can have in
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pressurizing the state on behalf of the poor, particularly within this era of rights-based policy
(Berichfield and Corsi, 2010).
1.2.2 Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan
The work of the PUCL was more focused on involving the poor in an effort to assist
them. However, looking at organizations like Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS) in
Rajasthan we see a social movement trend of mass-mobilization through the establishment of
grassroots movements. In the case of MKSS, three founders of the organization settled in the
village community of Devdungri, in central Rajasthan. Residing in the village, the three
founders, Aruna Roy, Nikhil Dey, and Shanker Singh, were able to discover the many difficulties
facing the villagers. They used their time – and their interactions with these villagers – to
observe, learn, and understand the critical issues that shape rural life. They were inspired by
stories about community members who struggled against injustice and worked towards social
and political reform against enormous odds, such as Lal Singh who organized a strike against
officers who forced constables such as himself to do domestic jobs like washing clothes.
One of the first actions that MKSS was successfully able to organize was the
repossession of community land that was overtaken by a local land lord, Hari Singh. Hari Singh
had taken over community land and was burdening the villagers with a tax to use the land. With
the assistance of the three MKSS founders, villagers were able to petition that Hari Singh no
longer continue his control of the land. However, this battle bordered on turning very violent
when villagers became enraged the Hari Singh arranged for two of the MKSS founder to be
physically assaulted, Shankar and Nikhil. The enraged and empowered villagers acted to assert
their rights to land and the lack of right Hari Singh had to arrange the assault the activists. We
see here an example of activists empowering locals to create action at a grassroots level.
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Villagers were empowered to not only act on their own behalf, but to act against the injustices
created by the powerful landlord (Ramkumar, 2004).
The empowerment of locals only grew with time. Large numbers of local participant
fought non-violent battles alongside MKSS for their right to minimum wage by participating in
sit-ins. Officials responded to their actions with notable hostility, even taking police action. The
officials insisted that workers had been paid the right amounts according to their financial
records, however they were also refusing all of MKSS’s requests to their payment records.
This withholding of information inspired the “Right to Information” (RTI) campaign of
MKSS. MKSS worked to collect copies of records such as bills, vouchers, cash books, and labor
rolls, which were then distributed to villagers. Villagers were then able to compare what was said
to have occurred according to the records to what actually occurred. Long-held suspicions were
proven to be true and villagers had the information to rise and demand their rights. The newly
found voice and empowerment stemming from access to information only grew as the RTI
campaign grew. The collective efforts of MKSS and locals can be seen in the fight that ensued
for transparency and accountability of the Indian government for all (Roy and Dey, 2011). The
fight resulted in the passage of the Right to Information Act, guaranteeing everyone access to
government documents on demand. Here we see the role of activists in inspiring grassroots level
action and larger mobilization of previously unorganized groups for change (Mishra, 2003;
Ramkumar, 2004; Roy and Dey, 2011). More importantly we see the use of the rights framework
in the formulation of the first rights-based legislation in India, the RTI.
There are obvious poverty alleviation benefits to rights-based policy that warrants the
interest of activists. However, this intent of such legislation goes beyond, serving the purpose of
extending citizenship to the marginalized and socially oppressed. India has witnessed many such
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social movements. Therefore, the extensive literature on social movements is justified. However,
the rights-based policy resulting from social movements in India has little research despite the
large impact it is capable of and has already had on the Indian population. Even fewer studies
have been done of activists involved in such movements for social justice through rights-based
policies and the operation of such programs. NREGA is just one of such program, which
happens to be the largest poverty alleviation and public employment program in the world. The
program has also had immense success in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh (AP). This success
has been largely attributed to the structure of the program in the state, which was built with the
consideration of previous failed program, as well as the extensive involvement of activists.
1.3

The Right to Work Movement
Of the rights-based policies created in India, NREGA is one of the most ambitious rights-

based legislation. In fact, it embodies in many ways the goals of rights-based legislation, to repoliticize poverty in a way that need-based policy failed. It allows people to demand from the
state, forcing the state to acknowledge that poverty is a political issue. The large population of
impoverished Indians makes this program even more ambitious in what it aims to accomplish.
With these considerations, such success and involvement of activists makes this development
program one that demands anthropological study. Still, little anthropological research on the
practice of rights-based development and such policy as NREGA has been done.
The strength of the rights-based framework and the subsequent role of activists is seen
once more in the “Right to Work” campaign; whose members largely worked to demand their
right to employment through the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA). This act
aims to ensure the security of at least 100 days of waged employment to members who volunteer
to perform the unskilled manual work the act offers. It is thought that by providing this security
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net to the people, India will not only be able to provide work for the poor, but also be able to
relieve some aspects of poverty, as well as begin to address the underdevelopment that is seen in
rural areas ("Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act”, 2005). The Act
places an enforceable obligation on the state, and gives bargaining power to the laborers. It
intended to create a relationship of accountability and gives the laborers legal entitlements such
as a minimum wage, guaranteed work on demand, and unemployment payments. It helps to
reduce the distress of migration to urban areas for work and is also seen as an opportunity to
create useful assets in rural areas (Drèze, 2011). Indian development economists Jean Drèze and
Christian Oldieges also see NREGA as a way to revitalize institutions of local governance,
including gram panchayats (village councils), and gram sabhas (village assemblies) by giving
them new purpose as well as substantial financial resources (Drèze and Oldieges, 2011).
Previous public works programs had existed, such as the National Food for Work
Programme (NFFWP) and the Sampoorna Grameen Rozgar Yojana (SGRY). NREGA was
different because it is a rights-based legislation and had proven itself more successful within its
first year of implementation by providing 90 crore person-days on employment. This number
was less than predicted by the National Advisory Council (who predicted 200 crore persondays), but far exceeded the amount of employment generated from previous works programs
(Drèze and Oldieges, 2011). This initiative in India is regarded as one of the world’s largest long
term social reform and relief plans, thus its success and failures provide important information to
consider for future programs of social change.
Despite the potential the program has in addressing poverty and poor living conditions
that affect India’s population, the rates of success of such a program have been variable when
looking at rates of employment between states. For example, the number of person days per rural
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household was 77 in Rajasthan in 2006-7, but 3 days in Kerala the same year (Khera, 2011: 25).
Such variation can be largely attributed to the decentralization of the program, in which the
national government plays some role, but a significant amount of responsibility of
implementation is given to each state and local governments.
1.4

Effectiveness and Transparency
Historically, a large obstacle to the success of government social improvement projects

has been corruption within the Indian government, involving misutilization of funds. This
corruption is caused by a variety of deep rooted cultural and historical phenomenon. Still, with
the idea that corruption has caused the failure of previous programs, and in fear of perpetuation
of such corruption, NREGA implemented auditing systems and increased spending transparency
to help insure that funds were being properly utilized. The previously discussed RTI movement
pioneered by MKSS ushered new ideologies of safeguards, and increased transparency as a
mechanism of increasing accountability and providing assurance of proper program
implementation. Safeguards include muster rolls (a sort of attendance sheet) present at all
worksites, regular maintenance of job cards kept with the laborers themselves, the payment of
wages in public, separation of payment agencies from implementation agencies, vigilance
committees at worksites, and social auditing systems (Drèze and Khera, 2011). However, the
implementation of these safeguards is also susceptible to variation and non-compliance, leading
to the continuation of corrupt behavior.
Another mechanism of transparency includes the posting of information such as the
number of households who request work, as well as the number of household who are provided
work on the NREGA website. In data analyzed from 2006-7 these two numbers were curiously
close and in some cases identical. Drèze comments that numerous field reports tell us otherwise,
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revealing that in some districts the work application process was not even in place. He speculates
that while the expenditure data may be reasonably accurate, the corresponding employment
figures may be inflated for the purpose of siphoning money from the program (Drèze, 2011).
While many states report high expenditure for NREGA programs, independent enquires often
reveal massive leakages in the money intended to reach the poor (Vanaik and Siddhartha, 2008).
Regardless of current success rates, such a program is important to study as it has
massive potential to improve the lives of the impoverished. Research has shown that individuals
employed by NREGA initiatives feel there are benefits to the employment it offers. In 2008 a
NREGA survey was conducted with the aim of understanding the impact the program had on the
lives of the workers who it employed. Responses revealed multiple flaws, but respondents also
noted benefits of the program. Women workers tended to express stories about the benefits of
NREGA, as well as the independence the work and wages gave them. Many respondents
believed NREGA opened up new opportunities for them. Regardless of the programs failures,
the intentions of NREGA and the employment it was able to provide were perceived as benefits
in individuals’ lives (Khera and Nayak, 2009).
1.5

Ineffeciveness and Corruption
It is clear to recognize the major development benefits of the program and it would be

reasonable to assume that increased benefit would coincide with a decrease in the prevalence of
corruption. It’s also important to consider the complexity that is corruption in India. Many
anthropologists have devoted research to understanding corruption in India, and its roots – the
basic gap between progressive legislation and the realities of village power dynamics (Witsoe,
2011; Jauregui, 2014; Björkman, 2014; Piliavsky, 2014). However, NREGA policy doesn’t
consider these root causes of corruption, rather claiming the failure to previous development
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programs with the umbrella term that is corruption. The solution to this problem of corruption
was thought to be increased transparency and accountability safeguards. The various
mechanisms in place make such behavior more difficult to engage in than in previous public
works programs such as NFFWP and SGRY. Regardless, it is clear that leakage of funds from
the program has happened in the early years of its implementation and continues to occur. For
example, despite the guarantee of minimum wage, some states have paid less than the statutory
minimum wage. Workers in Rajasthan were being paid on average Rs 51 a day in 2006-7,
although the minimum wage was Rs. 73 a day (Shankar and Gaiha, 2013).
The main cause of corruption in relation to this program is that those who are supposed to
implement the safeguards are a part a “nexus of corruption”, the terminology used by Drèze and
fellow economist Khera when referring to the individuals in coalition with one another for the
purpose of corrupt behavior (Drèze and Khera, 2011). When these individuals are interested in
siphoning money from the program there is likely to be negligence for the safeguards.
Three techniques are frequently used by the nexus of corruption: deception, collusion,
and exploitation. The abhikarta (an agent of implementation) may work with the local
postmaster responsible for distributing worker wages to inflate the work hours and payment on
the muster roll. This will deceive the government, and the abhikarta and postmaster will be able
to embezzle money from workers. Other fraud is associated with fake names in the payment
order or muster roll. The local leader responsible for implementation of the program may also
have family members’ names on the muster roll. Payment can then be inflated and the leader is
then able to the collect money for themselves. Exploitation may occur, by which the worker is
made to withdraw money from their bank account and give a share of their earnings to the
sarpanch. As yet another example of corruption, in the Karon block of Jharkand’s Deograth
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district the contractors were working together with official of a local cooperative bank to siphon
off funds from the accounts of NREGA workers. They would also ask NREGA workers to sign
withdrawal slips in bulk claiming it was for the purpose of make “proxy withdrawals” in their
name. They were then able to extort money from workers (Khera, 2011).
Much of the embezzlement of funds and extortion of money from workers occurs from
the laborers’ lack of knowledge regarding their own rights associated with NREGA. NREGA is
different from earlier employment schemes in that it is a rights-based program. The best
guarantee of workers achieving maximum benefit lies in the ability of workers to recognize their
rights. It also lies in organized demand of rights on the part of well-informed workers. For
example, if a worker insists on being paid the minimum wage, depriving them of their due wage
would be more difficult than if they had not demanded. There are many barriers inhibiting
workers’ demand for their rights.
This corruption that is discussed has a complexity in its prevalence and origins in India,
embedded within a legacy of patronage and brokerage. In fact, the role of politics and politicians,
particularly those at the lower levels of administration, in the everyday function of the Indian
state directly relates to this phenomenon of corruption (Piliavsky, 2014). Kanchan Chandra, in
her work on “ethnic politics”, comments on how India is a democracy in which elected
representatives have substantial control in the distribution of scarce economic resources
controlled by the state (Chandra, 2004). She makes the claim that India is a “patronage
democracy”; therefore, it is not hard to make the leap and say that control to resources elected
official have can be used for bartering for votes (Witsoe, 2012). The role of brokers at the
boundary between elected representatives of the state, and society places brokers as mediator
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between state resources and society, a phenomenon termed “political mediation” by Witsoe.
Such patronage relationships and supporting brokerage relationships arise from historical events.
This political patronage is characteristic of the postcolonial state, and influenced by a
colonial legacy of indirect rule. This legacy succeeded in forming an alliance between the ruling
state and local elites, within the colonial system of “limited raj” (Witsoe, 2012). Such
relationships between local elites and state persist, resulting in the contemporary influence of
patronage and brokerage. Corruption within NREGA is able to continue with the “nexus of
corruption”, but such corruption is deeply rooted in systems of patronage and brokerage
revealing the complex causes of corruption in Indian public life.
Still, the formulation of NREGA was made to combat corruption and not social
hierarchies and systems of patronage. The safeguards of transparency were created with the
purpose of being used by workers to hold lower level administration, largely responsible for misuse of funds, accountable. Thereby, reducing corrupt behavior. However, barriers to such the
actions exist, and allow corrupt behavior to persist.
1.6

Awareness
One such barrier is the lack of awareness amongst workers regarding their rights. In a

NREGA survey conducted in 2008 it was found that in the states of Bihar, Chhattisgarh,
Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, and Uttar Pradesh only 42% of workers were aware that they were
guaranteed 100 days of work, 43% were aware that they were to be paid minimum wage, and
54% knew that they were to receive payment within 15 days. Interestingly, levels of awareness
were significantly higher in Rajasthan. This can most likely be attributed to the state’s history
and long tradition of public mobilization for employment and wages in the context of drought
relief. This state also had mass awareness campaigns (Khera, 2011).
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The concept of NREGA is one that has the capability to strengthen the bargaining power
of unorganized workers by providing them the incentive and opportunity to organize around
something. With the promise of some levels of social security, the laborers should in theory have
less fear of unemployment. As Drèze comments, this fear of unemployment has the ability to
divide laborer populations and put them at the mercy of private contractors and other possible
exploiters (Drèze, 2011). However, all bargaining power of the poor is reliant on their awareness
of their rights. As M.S.A. Rao says regarding social movements, “A sufficient level of
understanding and reflection is required on the part of participants, and they must be able to
observe and perceive the contrast between the social and cultural conditions of the privileged and
those of the deprived, and must realize that it is possible to do something about it” (M.S.A. Rao
1979: 207). In this case, it is not so much the contrast between the privileged and the deprived
that the rural poor need to recognize, rather that contrast between what they are entitled to and
what they are receiving through NREGA. Rights are undermined by corruption. The solution to
this problem seems lie in increasing awareness, leading to and requiring organizing. Such
organizing has yet to be seen to spontaneously arise, and often involves activists or activist
organizations.
1.7

Rights-based Organizing
As mentioned previously, another strength of the program is realized when laborers are

able to organize themselves. The assumption made by the architects of the act was regarding the
capacity for largely unorganized workers to organize themselves in demand for their NREGA
entitlements, however the degree to which is seen in not significant. This could be attributed to
the lack of awareness regarding entitlements. Successes are expected in areas where workers are
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able to organize and mobilize, a characteristic of social movements in general. Rajni Kothari
comments on the strength of the unorganized when agitated and organized, writing:
There is a discontent and despair in the air – still highly diffuse, fragmented and
unorganized. But there is a growing awareness of rights, felt politically and expressed
politically, and by and large still aimed at the State. Whenever a mechanism of mobilization
has become available, this consciousness has found expression, often against very heavy
odds, against a constellation of interests that are too powerful and complacent to shed (even
share) the privileges.
(Kothari 1984: 218)
Activists provide the mechanism by which the unorganized worker population can be
organized to collectively claim the right to work through NREGA. As Dr. Ambedkar once
famously said, “Educate, agitate, and organize” (Shah, 1990). In a sense these are three basic
steps for any social movement and various social movements in India have followed this
structure. Development researcher Pramod Unia believes that the social movement structure is
one in which there is a central importance to social action groups and activists (Unia, 1991).
Unia also believes that “social action is centred around mobilization of the poor, through a sense
of moral outrage against injustice and inequality, for survival and identity” (Unia, 1991: 1). This
crucial role of activists, and the success of NREGA with their involvement further justifies why
these activists are important to study.
1.8

The Jagrut Adivasi Dalit Sangathan
Success in demands can be seen when workers are aware of their rights, and are

organized and empowered to act. This can be seen in the strength of grass roots organization,
such as the Jagrut Adivasi Dalit Sangathan (JADS) located in the Pati block of Bedwani district
of Madhya Pradesh. JADS is a local organization managed by activist members, all of whom are
local residents and rural workers who volunteer their time. This organization has been able to
achieve important results. Most laborers in Pati are aware of their rights under the NREGA. In a
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2008 survey it was found that all the sample workers in Pati knew that they are entitled to 100
days of work, 85% were aware of the minimum wage, and 95% knew that wages were supposed
to be paid within 15 days. More impressive is that apart from awareness of entitlements,
members were aware of the process through which these entitlements can be claimed. There are
also high rates of employment in this area. 92% of survey respondents in 2008 from the Pati
block had received work in response to their written applications. In addition to the high levels of
awareness, demand-driven employment that has taken root in Pati, a demand that is defining to
the functionality of the act but largely lacking throughout many areas of India. Many workers
were able to work for a full 100 days under NREGA. The average number of days employed
during the 12 months preceding the survey was as high as 85 days, compared with just 23 days in
the Rajpur block. Very few districts in the country can boast of similar levels of employment,
except Rajasthan, which as mentioned before has a history of public demand and mobilization.
The corresponding average for two districts surveyed in Rajasthan, Dungarpur and Sirohi, is 71
days.
The members of the Pati block feel a sense of empowerment. Khera provides two
excellent example from Pati in her analysis of the JADS’ work. In an effort to improve
timeliness of wage payments and reduce delay, the members of JADS levied a fine of Rs 1 per
day of delay of the panchayat secretary. Although the fine seems small, fines have been found to
deter noncompliance of rules (Khera, 2011). This is thought to be due to the stigma associated
with being fined. The determination of members to assert their rights is evident. Another strong
example of the members’ collective strength is in relation to the introduction of bank payments
of NREGA wage. Bank payments were introduced to the scheme as an effort to separate the
implementing agencies and the payment agencies as a mechanism to reduce corrupt behavior.
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Corruption becomes much easier when the implementing agency and the payment agency are the
same. When Malubhai, a member of JADS, was asked what he thought about the bank payment
system he said he was unsure. He understood that there was a new cost of getting to the bank,
which was in the neighboring village, but that it would reduce workers’ risk of being cheated.
Since the system implementation was mandated from the district administration he also
understood that they needed to try it out, but was certain that if they were unhappy with the
results all JADS needed to do was launch an agitation or action to revert back to the old system
of payment (Khera, 2011). This confidence is telling of the JADS members in their ability to
assert themselves and cause change. The level of awareness, organization, and assertion in
NREGA workers elsewhere contrast with that of JADS members in Pati.
The effects of organization are not isolated to Pati. The strength of organization was seen
in Rajasthan with the RTI movement and the involvement of the activist organization MKSS.
Interestingly, the levels of NREGA success in Rajasthan can also be attributed to the
involvement of MKSS. The people of Rajasthan were actively engaged in a struggle for the RTI
movement. Sudha Venu Menon believes that this spirit and empowerment causes people to assert
their legitimate rights and stay actively involved in the NREGA process. The role of MKSS in
empowering people, by increasing awareness and providing the basis for organization was
crucial to laborers’ ability to assert themselves. We can see that the assertion of rights through
NREGA can be brought about through organization of laborers who are aware of their rights and
recognize a difference between what they are entitled to and what they are receiving (Menon,
2008). Organization in tandem with awareness seems to empower workers to demand. However,
when the ability to organize is lacking, or the level of awareness, activists such as those in
MKSS can assist, resulting in increased success of development programs such as NREGA.
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1.9

Acts of Citizenship
What does it mean for a poor villager to have a “right to work”? Citizenship is best

phrased by American political theorist, Hannah Arendt who says people need to recognize that
they have “the right to have rights” (Arendt, 1966). Brazilian theorist Evelina Dagnino
comments of the success of Latin American movements in evoking this realization among
people. “Urban popular movements reached this… understanding of the intermingling of culture
and politics as soon as they realized that what they had to struggle for was not only their social
rights, housing, health, education, but their very right to have rights” (Alvarez et al., 1998: 48).
T.H. Marshall defines three main elements of citizenship. ‘Civil element (the rights
necessary for individual freedom), the political element (the right to participate in the exercise of
political power) and the social element, which he defined as “the whole range from the right to a
modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full of the social heritage
and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society” (Jaya,
2013: 5). Whereas T.H. Marshall is defining citizenship in a more universalized way, historian
Partha Chatterjee provides insight into concepts of citizenship within the context of India.
According to Partha Chatterjee, postcolonial politics present a division between elite who inhabit
“civil society”. Members of this “civil society” enjoy access to rights and citizenship. In contrast,
the remaining members of society, or “political society” are subjected to the “politics of the
governed” and influence of classic patron-client relationships (Chatterjee, 2004). In this sense,
the citizenship this “political society” receives is governed and not freely accessible. In theory
however, there is formal citizenship, in the sense that every citizen is a member of the formal
legal constitution structure, receiving full acknowledgement by the state. The contradiction arises
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in the apparent lack of citizenship in the village context, in which social hierarchies and power
dynamics negate access to substantial citizenship by the oppressed.
Niraja Gopal Jaya acknowledges in her book “Citizenship and its Discontents” that
citizenship also involves the power of people to oppose the state. “It demonstrated to [citizens]
who they could be as members of the political community, as participants in political endeavors
that frequently placed them in adversarial positions vis-á-vis the state.” (Jaya, 2013: 7). In the
case of India, the incongruence between liberal state policy by higher level administration, and
conservative patronage relationship and social hierarchies of the village context that affect lower
level administration creates a different need of citizenship than said by Jaya. Kaviraj comments
on this incongruence saying, “the Indian state has feet of vernacular clay” (Kaviraj, 1988).
Rather than merely between the state, the village context creates a need for citizenship to include
the ability to combat local links to state workers interact with. These actors are lower level
administration, patrons, and brokers who are largely responsible for much of the misuse of
NREGA funds.
1.10

Political Mediation
Citizenship is seen as the right to have rights (Arendt, 1966; Tate, 2007). As citizens of

India, NREGA laborers are entitled to their rights as declared by the constitution. Many times
these rights are not fulfilled, rather the rights relationship between the larger state government
and impoverished citizens is interrupted by local intermediaries who translate rights to
patronage. Workers still receive benefits, but fail to receive the true benefits of rights-based
development. As a result, rights-based development fails to reach its full potential of social
transformation. Classic intermediaries between higher level administration, or the “state”, and
“society” include lower level government administration, local patrons, and brokers.
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A broker, according to Eric Wolf, is a “powerful yet marginal and vulnerable figure
located between fault lines and connection points within complex systems and relationships”
(Lewis, 2006: 12). Witsoe goes further to say that their position between state and society makes
brokers “political mediators”. These brokers and their involvement in the execution of programs
such as NREGA demonstrate the importance of understanding such intermediary figures. David
Lewis, specialist in social policy and development, has stated that this role of brokers
demonstrates “that brokerage is required by the co-existence of different rationalities, interests,
and meanings, so as to produce order, legitimacy, and “success” and to maintain fund flows”
(Lewis, 2006: 13). However, the previous quote fails to acknowledge that activists also behave
as intermediates between state and society, and that brokers may not necessarily be required.
Although the role of brokers as mediator has been given some attention, the role of activists also
fulfilling an intermediary role has not been explored extensively.
Similar to brokers and patrons, activists hold a position between society and state.
However, their relationship with rural workers is not structured in a traditional patron-client
relationship. I argue that they do not function as political mediators, rather as mediators of
citizenship. The distinction not denying the role of both as intermediaries between state and
society, but rather reflecting the difference in how they navigate village systems and the NREGA
program, as well as the difference in outcomes experienced by workers. There is a contradiction
and severe disparity between liberal right-based policy conceptualized with an explicit rights
framework, and the absence of citizenship thought to accompany claims to such rights. NREGA
provides a rights-based policy through which such a contradiction and the role of activists
overcoming this contradiction can be further analyzed.
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1.11

Methods
With the intentions of studying activists involved with the operation of NREGA in the

state of AP, I began exploring my connections in search of an appropriate research village to
serve as my fieldwork site. Fortunately, a preexisting network of vocal and highly involved
activists and volunteers exists through the AID India organization. The organization has a wide
presence within the United States and has branches throughout the country. The nearest branch
to Union College was the Troy branch. A brief email to the president of this local chapter
explaining my search for a research site and interest in NREGA activists of AP, brought Ajay
Kumar to my attention. Much to my luck, Ajay Kumar, an activist and leader of activist
organization and network APVVU, was due to visit the United States from India during the
summer of 2015, conveniently the summer I was in search of a field site. Still, I searched for
alternative activist organizations in AP with the fear that Ajay Kumar could not help me. My
thesis advisor, Professor Jeffrey Witsoe, connected me with activists he knew. Each email sent,
and each path of connections I followed led me to the same man, Ajay Kumar. Even a
conversation with researcher Rajesh Veeraraghavan, who recently completed his dissertation on
NREGA in AP, concluded with advise to work Ajay Kumar for this study.
Early in the summer of 2015 I traveled to Buffalo, New York to see Ajay Kumar speak. I
was in coordination with the president of the Buffalo AID India chapter, Santosh, for
accommodations and event details. We had arranged for me to stay in Santosh’s house, and when
I arrived I found a middle aged man wearing a distressed kurti shirt and worn pants sitting on his
sofa looking at me through his broken glasses. He was introduced to me as Ajay Kumar. His
humble appearance and fluent English told me that despite his simple lifestyle he was a highly
educated man, versed in Indian policy, law, and the ongoing fight for rights. It was through this
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connection with Ajay Kumar that I was introduced to Sunil and the mandal of Nathavaram. A
mandal is similar to a county, and is made of numerous villages. Sunil was the grassroots level
activist I was looking to find, and the mandal he worked in was the activist affected field site I
aimed to explore. The connections I made through Sunil brought me to the village site of G.K.
Godam, a village that allowed me to study the complexity of village life and local patronage.
Fieldwork was conducted for one month during the summer of 2015, and another month
during the winter of 2015-16. The first round of fieldwork had a focus on Sunil and his
involvement with local workers and officials. During this round of work, I lived in the mandal
center of Nathavaram with Ajay Kumar’s mother in law. The second round of fieldwork focused
on a specific village called G.K. Godam, where I lived in the room of a local teacher. This
second period functioned to reveal the intricacy of village life, embedded hierarchies of
patronage affecting villagers, and how workers experience NREGA.
I had expected to incur challenges during my time in India. One I had not expected, but
faced was a language barrier. Despite my fluency in Telugu, regional differences made
understanding language and communicating difficult in my initial days. This obstacle was
overcome in a short period of time, but other challenges were also present. My inquiry into local
politics and parties led me to face resistance and hostility by local elites and party members. As I
will discuss later in more detail, politics plays a significant role in everyday village life. The
pervasiveness of politics and political parties within villages, and the connections political
affiliations create give local politicians and party leaders considerable power and influence.
Therefore, when local political leaders felt my presence was threatening, actions were taken to
dissuade me from pursuing my research into what they felt were their private matters.
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One such situation I faced was when I was investigating a land issue in G.K. Godam. The
ex-president of the village, and current leader of the popular TDP political party, arrived on the
back seat of a motorcycle accompanied by a young man. The president was very interested in my
activities related to this particular land issue. Later when walking in the mandal center of
Nathavaram a member of the local police department stopped me on the street. “People are
talking about you everywhere. I just need some clarification of who you are and why you are
here. If you could just come to the station and explain that would be good.” I ask him if I have
done something wrong that requires me to come to the station. He replied, “People just see you
roaming with men and Sunil and are growing concerned. Why are you going to G.K. Godam
daily? What’s there of importance?” Questioning like this from the police became a regular
occurrence. On a few occasions, I was brought in for interrogation with the suspicion I had
involvement in local illegal activity. Interestingly, with the police officer in this first encounter
was the young man that I had seen with the ex-president. I can assume that such police interest
was instigated by the local TDP leader, as it began after my involvement in such land issues and
inquiries into local politics. It was later revealed that the leader was providing high interest loans
to the small landowners in the areas. If the land issue was resolved, small landowners would be
able to receive low interest loans and he would no longer being making money or have as strong
an influence in their lives as a local patron.
My gender was also a challenge at times. The regular and independent traveling I did led
to much of the questioning the police and other members of the community had. A significant
amount of this questioning implied judgement of my character as a woman, and were
accompanied by warnings against my possible promiscuous behaviors. Being a woman also
made it difficult to enter social meetings of local men. When I was able to participate in such
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meetings, I can only assume that the men were hesitant to speak freely in my presence. I was,
however, able to participate in social interactions with women, something that would be difficult
for a man in my position to do. This proved to be a useful tool to understanding village life. Still,
social curfews were clear for all women and applied to me as well, but did not apply to men.
Fears for my safety prevented my hosts during both of my fieldwork periods from allowing me
to leave the house past dark. This again provided another obstacle as many discussions and
decisions regarding village operation and life were made at night, and many of the men making
such decisions would meet to drink and discuss after dark. I was left to gather information on
what had happened from conversations with village women in the mornings after such meetings.
Despite facing such obstacles, I was able to gain insight into village life and the operation
of NREGA in AP, as well as the involvement of local activists. I relied on participant
observation to gather my data during my fieldwork. Time provided another constraint, as two
months to collect such information is a short amount of time. However, the assistance I received
in finding such a field site, my previous knowledge of Indian practices from being raised IndianAmerican, as well as my awareness of village life and practices from previous visits to India
helped me adjust quickly to my environment and gather information more effectively than if I
had no guidance or such previous experiences. My fieldwork allowed me to dynamically analyze
the operation of NREGA in AP by providing me insight into the bureaucratic operation of the
program, the highly integral role of activists, the involvement of local patrons, and the navigation
and experience of NREGA by workers.
1.12

Upcoming Chapters
Chapter 2 will provide an overview of how NREGA is intended to function within the

AP. Chapter 3 will introduce my research village as well as provide examples and context of
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village social hierarchies, power dynamics, village politics, and patron-client/brokerage
relationships. Chapter 4 will explore the realities of NREGA in the village context, specifically
typical paths of NREGA navigation by workers. Non-activist paths pursued by workers will
provide more insight into village hierarchies and power dynamics. Chapter 5 will introduce
Sunil, local activists and dalit man. This chapter will explore how Sunil is able to help workers
claim rights through NREGA. Chapter 6 will provide a conclusion and further analysis of Sunil’s
intermediary role in claims to citizenship and rights.
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Chapter 2: The Intentions and Operation of NREGA in Andhra Pradesh
The National Rural Employment Guarantee Act was enacted in 2005 to guarantee
employment, in the form of unskilled manual labor, to any eligible citizen of rural India. Many
of those aware of the act refer to it as NREGA. NREGA promises 100 days of work per
household, minimum wage paid either hourly or piece wise, and the creation of useful assets
contributing to local rural infrastructure (Operation Manual, 2006; Khera, 2011). The
implementation of NREGA varies by state, and Andhra Pradesh is one of the top performers in
the country (Shankar and Gaiha, 2013).
The program intends to empower, and eliminate methods of corruption that Indian
government attributes to the failure of previous poverty alleviation programs. Further, the
formation of this rights-based policy aim not only to alleviate poverty, but also bypass social
boundaries, hierarchies, and oppressive systems at the local village level that have historically
prevented the socially disadvantaged poor from claiming their rights.
2.1

Past Policy Failures– The Case of Food for Work
Reflecting on the failure of previous poverty alleviation policies, the Indian government

came to the consensus that corruption within government programs is the largest cause for such
failures. This corrupt behavior stops beneficiaries, largely the poor, from receiving the benefits
they are entitled to by law. The recognition of the high levels of corruption within programs, and
the movement towards formulating policy in a way that prevents such behavior, is a large step
for Indian poverty alleviation policy and is thought to contribute to the successes of NREGA
However, as previously mentioned the corruption such policy was formulated to prevent goes
beyond the term “corruption”. Rather it is important to acknowledge that such corruption is
rooted in village systems of patronage and politics, evolved from colonial systems of indirect
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rule and the “limited raj”, as discussed in Chapter 1. Despite the short comings that accompany
this lack of deeper understanding of corruption, NREGA policy and its self-regulation systems of
transparency and accountability are progressive in that they include acknowledgement that
government corruption is the cause for program failure and perpetuation of poverty re-politicizes
poverty, a successful step in the direction of the rights-based framework.
Prior to NREGA, the state of Andhra Pradesh faced the failure of the National Food for
Work (NFFW) program, also referred to as the “Food for Work” program (FFW), and the high
levels of corruption accompanying this failure. With the consideration of the general failures of
this previous poverty alleviation program, or “schemes” as they are commonly referred to in
India, NREGA was designed with various safeguards to prevent the leakage of funds that made
previous programs unsuccessful, the FFW program being the most recent such failure
(Deshingkar et al., 2005; Khera, 2011).
The Food for Work program, similar to NREGA was created in an effort to alleviate the
effects of poverty. It was designed to provide food in the form of rice, in exchange for unskilled
manual labor. Similar to NREGA, FFW was a self-selecting program. This meant that it offered,
as its name implies, food for work for any Indian willing to perform the unskilled manual labor.
Generally speaking, only those in need for food would participate in such manual labor.
FFW was infamously ridden with the effects of corruption, providing a haunting lesson
for the implementation of NREGA in AP. Deshingkar and Johnson explore the causes of FFW’s
failure in AP in a case study of the program. Ultimately they claim that the high levels of
misallocation of food, and misuse of resources in the FFW program was due to the heavy
dependence on local channels of administration, and the failure of the decentralized Indian
government in regulating the program (Deshingkar and Johnson, 2005). This conclusion was also
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supported by development researcher Radhika Nayak and colleagues who studied the failure of
previous poverty programs (Nayak et al., 2002).
2.1.1 The Administrative Hierarchy and Decentralization
Before I discuss the proposed role of decentralization in the failure of the program, it is
important to review the general structure of Indian government, and the policy implementation
hierarchy. Legislation such as NREGA and FFW is implemented from the central government,
but is administered at the state level through an administrative hierarchy. The state is divided into
districts, and the districts are further divided into mandals, unique to the state of Andhra Pradesh.
In other states, districts are instead divided into larger blocks. Mandals are divided into gram
panchayats, and these panchayats are divided into villages. NREGA is implemented from the
central government, but is administered at the state level though such a hierarchy. There are four
tiers of administration at the four levels of the administration hierarchy: state, district, mandal,
and panchayat/village levels.

Figure 1. This figure provides and overview of the administrative context of Andhra Pradesh.
NREGA is administered similarly in other state, with the exception of the mandal.

(Veeraraghavan, 2015)
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This level of decentralization was created with the intentions that it would lead to greater
participation by the rural poor, as well as increase their access to government. The 73rd
Amendment of the Indian Constitution gives village, block and district level bodies a
constitutional status under Indian law (Nambiar, 2001). This is primarily done through gram
sabhas within gram panchayats.
2.1.2 The Gram Sabha
The gram sabha, which is all the eligible voters within a gram panchayat area, is intended
to serve as a means for transparency and accountability within local government. The gram
sabha was created to ensure that even marginal groups are included in local politics.
Representatives are then to act in ways that support their formal elected responsibilities, as well
as act on behalf of the interests of the constituents of the gram sabha. In practice, however, this
system has largely failed to live up to satisfy this ideal function. Various studies regarding
decentralization in India highlight the failure of gram sabhas and panchayat meetings in
preventing the control of panchayats by local elites. They also show that many times these gram
sabhas also fail to satisfy their role as a mechanism for transparency and accountability
(Nambiar, 2001; Deshpande and Murthy, 2002).
High levels of decentralization within programs are also associated with increased levels
of patronage and brokerage relationships. The story of FFW supports this. Deshingkar and
Johnson discuss how misallocation of funds and food within the program were also attributed to
use of contractors and brokers. Although the involvement of local contractors was prohibited by
the FFW program legislation, the decentralized nature with heavy emphasis on local
administration is one of the causes to the prevalence of this phenomenon.
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In theory, the gram sabha is intended to provide a way for FFW beneficiaries to over-ride
the power of local officials and elites, many of whom were the main contractors and brokers
diverting FFW rice away from the rural poor. However, it was generally unable to fulfill this
role. According to the FFW guidelines, laborers would have interacted with panchayat officials
to obtain employment. However, contractors were found to be the main drivers for both work
identification and allocation. The works that were actually approved reflected the priorities of the
contractors who were invariably politically and socially powerful.
Information dissemination regarding the worker entitlement with FFW was also low. Key
informant interviews and focus group discussions by Deshingkar and Johnson reveal that most
villagers did not know how much rice their village received. Nor were they aware of their
entitlement in terms of the amount of rice to be paid as wages and how long they would get work
for (Deshingkar and Johnson, 2005).
In conclusion, this study found that beneficiary selection and works identification done
through decentralized means were ineffective due to existing structures of patronage, power, and
rent-seeking. Panchayat officials and sarpanches were found to be instrumental in the corruption
in FFW. The failure of FFW calls into question the promise that decentralization holds for
improved accountability and better service delivery. The case of FFW also reinforces that such
mismanagement and misappropriation are important causes of continuing poverty and
deprivation.
Unlike previous programs such as the FFW program, NREGA attempted to differentiate
itself by removing the heavy role of the sarpanch and local panchayat officials in the
implementation of the program, as well as creating numerous safeguards to increase
accountability (Veeraraghavan, 2015). Understanding the negative consequences of
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decentralization, NREGA policy was also fitted with safeguards in addition to its attempts to
centralize the management and implementation structures. These safeguards are heavily rooted in
increased transparency.
2.2

Re-centralizing NREGA Implementation
In practice, the significant players in NREGA in AP are at the state level and the lower-

level bureaucrats at the mandal level. The most important official actors in the operation of
NREGA in Andhra Pradesh are the upper-level bureaucrats and the lower-level bureaucrats. In
an effort to decrease decentralization and its effects on programs, as experienced with FFW,
NREGA removed the power of fulfilling workers’ demand for work from local panchayat
elected officials. Instead, this power was given to centrally appointed administrative officials at
local levels reporting to centrally appointed officials at mandal levels. Additionally, these
positions were specified to be temporary contracted positions. This was stipulated to insure that
officials do not remain in one location for long enough to build networks and relationships to
engage in corrupt behavior. Such connections are necessary for Drèze’s “nexus of corruption” to
occur.
The Mandal Parishad Development Officer (MPDO), or MDO as it was commonly
referred to, is responsible for overseeing all the NREGA activity in the mandal area. Each gram
panchayat of the mandal has its own field assistant (FA). The FA is typically from the same
panchayat of the village. Many panchayats only have one to two villages within them so the FA
is generally from the same village as well. The FA has the responsibility of giving work to the
workers at the village level, as well as maintaining attendance registers, and making key field
level decisions. It is important to note that the FA is not a member of the village panchayat. This
is an administrative position to which the FA was appointed.
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The remaining positions at the mandal level include those of the technical assistant (TA),
the engineering consultant (EC), the additional program officer (APO), and the computer
assistant or computer operator (CO). Similar to the FA, the TA, APO and EC are appointed at the
state level, in an attempt to remove them from local political influences. The TA and EC have
similar roles in that they both serves to measure the amount of work done. In the Andhra Pradesh
system of NREGA, payment to workers is made in a piece-rate basis. This means that the
workers are not paid by the amount of time they work per day, as workers are paid in other
states, rather they are paid by how much work they physically do. The TAs are meant to
regularly measure the work. They must also maintain the measurement books to document the
dimensions of the work. The EC takes the initial and final measurements of any NREGA
projects. COs have the responsibility of digitizing all records of NREGA work into the online
NREGA system. Due to the increased emphasis on transparency this role is seen as critical to the
implementation of NREGA in Andhra Pradesh. The appointment of the COs also occurs at the
state level. COs all receive training at the district levels on how to operate the computers, work
with the software, as well as install the software required. The manual dictates the 2 COs be
appointed for mandal, with one reporting to the program officer and the other to the MPDO.
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Figure 2. This image depicts the administrative hierarchy for NREGA implementation. It
presents each important administrative figure, and the level at which they operate.
(Veeraraghavan, 2015)

Central appointment of these administrative officials is an effort to reduce influence of
local politics on the administration and implementation of NREGA. Similarly, the temporary
contracts of these positions, and the frequent transfers of these government employees is done to
reduce the influence of local politics on their actions. The hierarchy within which they work is
yet another attempt to increase scrutiny of the work that is being done by administrative officials
lower in the hierarchy by those higher in the hierarchy.
2.3

Uses of Transparency and Technology
With the acknowledgment that there were high levels of corrupt behavior hindering the

success of poverty alleviation programs such as FFW, NREGA was constructed with various
transparency mechanisms to increase accountability amongst the low-level bureaucrats and
politicians involved in implementation of such programs, as well as reduce the subsequent
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leakage of resources. The Andhra model of governance in NREGA functions with this
understanding.
Efforts have been made to build a state-civil society “sandwich”. This “sandwich” refers
to the abilities of high-level bureaucrats and workers to exert pressure on low-level bureaucrats
and local politicians and “squeeze” out corruption. Transparency within NREGA has been
increased to increase the surveillance by the two sides of the sandwich, high-level bureaucrats
and worker. Increases in access to information and expected increased surveillance is intended to
allow both sides of this sandwich to pressurize corrupt low-level officials and politicians (Fox,
1993).
The availability of information and the theoretical pressurizing power of workers from
the bottom of this sandwich functions as a source of empowerment, the access to information
providing them the ammunition to bring consequences to corrupt officials, as well as receive
their rights according to NREGA.
All the data of NREGA works is posted on the public NREGA website. Payments are
intended to be made publicly in post offices as another mechanism to insure workers are
receiving the appropriate amount of payment. Other safeguards include muster rolls, a form of
attendance sheet. These muster rolls are remotely generated to prevent benami (false) entries and
names. The muster roll is expected to be maintained by the FA, as well as the mates. Job cards
are also mandatory for each household participating in NREGA works. This are kept by the
workers themselves to track what work they have been given, and when. Similarly, each worker
keeps their own passbook. In these passbooks a record is kept of when workers are receiving
payments for their work. Payment slips are given to each worker in addition to a record in their
passbook. This payment slip is a receipt of sorts, indicating how much they are being paid and
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for how much work. Payments are made at post offices and publicly, to encourage public
scrutiny of payments.
These safeguard mechanisms, and the increased levels of transparency are attempts to
pressurize the lower-level bureaucrats who are largely responsible for the misallocation of funds.
This “sandwich” described by Fox is one in which the lower level bureaucrats should
theoretically be pressurized by both state and civil society. The state being the higher-level
bureaucrats of the program, and the civil society being the NREGA workers (Fox, 1993).
2.3.1 The Social Auditing System
The peak of MKSS’ influence and the RTI movement coincide in time with NREGA
legislation, therefore it’s not surprising that the movement influenced NREGA legislation. One
result of this influence was the use of social audits in the program (Baviskar, 2010). Andhra
Pradesh has gone so far as to institutionalize audits. This auditing process consists of three main
steps. The first step involves scrutiny of government documents such as muster rolls and
measurement books by a centrally trained social auditor. The auditor will measure worksites to
make sure that they coincide with what was recorded. It is also their responsibility to read the
muster rolls aloud to confirm that the records are in fact correct. In the second step workers are
encouraged to provide written testimonies either supporting or countering the government
records. It is in the third step that all the audit documents are examined in a village public
hearing. In this hearing both the government records and the audit reports are presented. This
step allows the public a chance to speak. Any confirmed discrepancies are met with penalties
such as fines, or suspension/termination of bureaucrats (Sushmita, 2013; Veeraraghavan, 2015;
Operation Manual, 2006).
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2.3.2 Biometric Identification and Aadhar Cards
Recently biometric identification in tandem with personalized national identification
cards, called Aadhar cards, have been employed to confirm the identities of NREGA workers.
These stringent identification tools are used to insure that only the worker is claiming his/her
payments. Finger prints are a popular biometric identification. In cases where finger prints fail to
register, eye scans can be used as an alternative form of identification. All workers should also
have a personal Aadhar card, and have the accompanying Aadhar number linked to their
NREGA account within the extensive NREGA database. These numbers are confirmed for the
worker to receive his or her payment.
Whereas gram sabhas failed to increased transparency and empower the marginalized
village population who comprise the poverty alleviation program beneficiaries, NREGA
centralizes transparency efforts and looks to provide access to information that is independent of
local governments and gram sabhas. This transparency is thought to lead to accountability and
increased pressure on corruption within lower government and among local politicians.
Additionally, worker protection safeguards are used to grant access to NREGA benefits to only
workers, such as biometric identification and Aadhar cards. Social audits provide another outlet
for worker to expose misuse of fund within the program, an appropriate alternative to the gram
sabhas in which marginalized worker participation is generally low (Nambiar, 2001). NREGA
policy equips workers with the tools to reclaim entitlements when corruption may occur, and to
pressurize government officials to insure their entitlements are not misused. This just one way
the rights-based policy aims to empower workers. The act also stipulates that work be given on
the demand of the workers, another method of empowering workers.
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2.4

Work on Demand
NREGA famously promises that the workers receive work when they demand for it. This

functions to empower workers to make a direct claim to their right to work, insuring they are not
dependent on work being made available to them. The FFW program relied on local officials
within the panchayat to respond to worker demand. NREGA, removes this interaction between
panchayat and worker, by allowing the worker to make the demand for their right to work
directly to the state, through a state appointed official, the FA. This demand for work from the
state is made through a worker group leader called a mate.
Workers are organized into groups, which are led by a mate. This mate is responsible for
taking attendance, as well as supervising work. Their role is acknowledged by the state, and they
are given additional payment for their work. They have also been hired by the state to act on
behalf of their group, as a representative who is responsible for maintain and filling out official
documents such as demand forms, and muster rolls. The mate system was created as a controlled
alternative to contractors, the use of whom was extensive in FFW. Mates fulfill some of the roles
of contractors, such as managing the demand for work. In submitting the required form on behalf
of their groups, they are also responsible for satisfying the demand for work made by their fellow
workers. In compensation for duties they fill, mates are given additional financial payments.
They are also given financial incentives when they involve more people in NREGA works. This
is done in an attempt to deter them from selectively giving access to work. These work groups
are also important in payment calculation per worker. The piece-rate system of payment
measures the collective output of each workgroup, rather than tracking the work output of each
individual. This method of measurement is enforced to incentivize the workers to work
collaboratively (Operation Manual, 2006).
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The ability to receive work on demand rather than when local government officials
decide to provide work, increases the connection of workers to the state, and is intended to
reduce the influence of local relationships and politics, as well as increase the workers’ claim to
rights. These local relationships and associated politics are responsible for patronage and
brokerage relationships associated with the failure of previous programs, as well as the
mismanagement and leakage of funds referred to as corruption. NREGA provided workers with
the benefits associated with receiving work and payment, but also caused a subsequent increase
in agricultural wages.
2.5

Satisfying Local Interests
Higher agricultural wages were the result of the established minimum wages of NREGA.

The creation of guaranteed work and minimum wage caused the increases in agricultural wages,
establishing an unofficial wage standard. NREGA also created an alternative employment to
agricultural work, creating competition between agriculture employers and NREGA
employment. To make sure that small farmers were not suffering from the loss of labor and
NREGA associated wage increases, NREGA made provisions to satisfy local actors and
alleviated potential local effects on small farmers. Small landowners are thought to suffer the
most from the increases in wages caused by NREGA (Veeraraghavan, 2015).
To ensure that rural agricultural economy is not negatively affected by NREGA work,
NREGA stipulates that work is provided during non-agricultural seasons. This is to combat the
preference workers could give to participating in NREGA work over agricultural work.
Additionally, small landowners have been given significant consideration when determining
where NREGA work can occur. Whereas large landowners are more capable of paying higher
wages, small landowner saw themselves as financially unable to support these higher wages.
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Decreased participation of small landowners in rural economies could result in increased
economic power and control of large landowners in villages. These large landowners are often
the local elites involved in the exploitation of workers and local systems of patronage. To stop
such increases in power, while supporting small landowners in the rural economy, NREGA
policy in AP clauses that NREGA work can occur on private land of small owners. This work on
private land has many provisions to minimize misuse of the NREGA system. First priority for
NREGA subsidized labor is given to disadvantaged members of the community, specifically
small landowners of lower castes. Landowners must also have less than 5 acres of land. NREGA
also identifies what works can occur on private land to insure that the works can still be
classified as requiring unskilled labor. Therefore, the NREGA subsidized labor is not agricultural
labor, but works such as digging irrigation channels. The struggle of the increased wages is felt
most by these small farmers, but in many ways has been mitigated by such NREGA labor
subsidy.
Members of local economies were given consideration as to reduce negative economic
effects of the program on the rural communities, as well as to reduce backlash towards to policy
by local opposition such as landowners. Consideration was also given to increase buy-in by local
actors and reduce reasons they may have to interfere with NREGA operation. NREGA
provisions were made in an effort to successfully empower workers, reduce local interference,
and to reduce levels of corrupt behavior, while providing an employment safety net and
alleviating rural poverty and its subsequent effects.
2.6

Summary
The NREGA policy was created with some understanding of the transformative potential

of rights-based policy as well as village systems of power inhibiting the voice of the
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marginalized, but failed to make the connection that oppressive local systems of patronage have
the capability to cause corrupt behavior and the failure government programs. Therefore, it is not
surprising that despite the precautions taken within the NREGA legislation, the operation of the
program deviates from what is specified in the act, guidelines, and operation manual. To
understand why the operation of the program varies, it is important to understand the village
context, the complexity of “corruption” NREGA attempts to confront, and the various social
factors that contribute to the behavior and roles of the various members involved in the operation
of NREGA.
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Chapter 3: The Village Context of G.K. Godam
NREGA operates at the village level, therefore performing an anthropological analysis of
NREGA and associated rights-based activism requires an understanding of village dynamics.
Understanding the village involves an understanding of caste, class, politics, how they are
intertwining, as well as the historical context of colonial legacy from which they developed into
defining features of the contemporary postcolonial Indian village. With the manifestation of
caste, class, and politics in everyday village life and society, it is not surprising that these
features affect the operation of NREGA. These factors influence many of the interactions
villagers have with one another, including those who are involved in the implementation of
NREGA and those receiving work through it. Before understanding the implications of such
factors on NREGA operation, an understanding of their prevalence in daily life needs to be
established, as well as the influence such factors have in the social hierarchy, power relations,
and power dynamics of a village. During my fieldwork in the village of G.K. Godam, where I
lived during the month of December 2015, I witnessed just how entrenched such factors were.
Thus, such an understanding provides the background necessary for a thorough analysis of
NREGA, the factors that undermine the effectiveness of NREGA, as well as the need for rightsbased activists in the day-to-day operation of the program and mediation of claims to citizenship
by NREGA participants.
3.1

Caste and Class
When I ask Manga, a woman who lives near the entrance of the village, whether people

of different caste groups live in different areas she says, “no! of course not”. OC households are
somewhat scattered among BC households. Still it is clear there is a larger concentration of OC
households present near the entrance of the village. When I walk further into the village,

51

following what seems to be the main road, small huts of OC/BC households appear to my right.
My initial days in G.K. Godam were spent investigating the distribution of caste and class
throughout the village.
3.1.1 Caste in AP
Three significant caste classifications exist in the state of Andhra Pradesh. These are
Other Category or Open Category castes (OC), Other Backward Classes/Castes (OBC) or
Backward Classes/Castes (BC), and Scheduled Classes/Castes (SC). Members of the tribal
community are referred to as Scheduled Tribes (ST). OC castes refer to the upper castes of the
state. Significant upper castes include Kamma, and Reddy, who comprise approximately 4.8%
and 6.5% of the state’s population respectively. These are land-owning communities that have
historically exercised control over agrarian resources such as land and water. Such control of
resources has been an important source to their economic and political power within villages.
Traditionally, they have had control of village political life, a culmination of the influence of
their class, caste, and political power. Other influential castes include Velamas and Kapus, also
classified as OCs in many regions of Andhra Pradesh. Kapus are sometimes classified as BCs.
OBCs comprise approximately 46% of the state’s population. Castes in this category
include Gollas (shepards), Padmasalis (weavers), and many others. SCs, also known as the
untouchable castes or dalits, have two large castes of Madiga (leather worker caste) and Mala
(agrarian labor caste). Relli is another large population dalit caste. According to the 2001 Indian
Census 7.6% the Vishakapatnam district population was SC. Of this population 22.4% Madiga,
58.26% Mala, 14.35% Relli, and 5.06% was others SC castes (Srinivasulu, 2002).
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3.1.2 Caste in the Village
A brief survey revealed that there were about 50 houses in the village, each household
differing significantly in relative wealth. BC families are predominant in the village, and seem to
be fewer OC families, but there are noticeably few SC households. Only 5 SC households exists
in G.K Godam, and are located at the edge of the village separated by a tall wooden fence.

Figure 1. This is a sketch of the relative set up of the village. Included are denominations for
caste separation within the village. Key locations and household are marked.

Historically, there has been an association between caste and occupation, related to
concepts of purity and pollution. However, stringent caste based occupation restrictions has been
reduced in recent time, as is visible in G.K. Godam. Members of the village, regardless of caste
participate in common jobs such as herding cows and goats, unskilled labor referred to as coolie
work, farming referred to as vyavasayam, migration for work, and cheru pani or NREGA works.
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Migration is generally to large urban centers. There are two types of significant migration: daily
migration, and seasonal migration. Daily migration is generally to the nearest urban center of
Narsipatnam. Longer term migration can be to the cities within Andhra Pradesh, such as
Vishakapatnam, or to Hyderabad, former capital of Andhra Pradesh and current capital of the
newly formed neighboring Telangana state. Other long term migration includes seasonal migrate
to states such as Bihar, Tamil Nadu, or Maharashtra. There are also governments positions
within the village such as working in the village school.
I walked through the village the day I arrive, slowly making my way to Gopi’s house, one
of my previous acquaintances. It’s early in the morning, before everyone begins leaving to
participate in agricultural work. It’s at this time in the day that the men of the village gather at
the entrance of the village and talk, and women exchanged conversation by the village bores. I
make it to Gopi’s house, despite being stopped with questions of who I was and where I was
from by the groups of villagers participating in their regular morning mingling. Gopi lives in a
thatch roof home closer to the edge of the village, around the corner from the SC section and
near the village school. The house has two rooms with a fire stove in the front, and a chicken tied
down in the small dirt space surrounding the home. It appears to be an average home, but is not
as large as some of the other homes in the village. Gopi sees me sitting on his patio floor talking
to his wife cooking at their outdoor stove. He runs to grab me a chair, disregarding my assuring
him that I am satisfied with the floor. We both sit and enjoy a glass of tea. He’s already
committed me to lunch in his home and his wife is busy with the preparations.
“How do you like my home?” he enquires motioning to the two rooms behind him. “See,
we have nothing in this house and work hard so our sons don’t have to become coolies.” Gopi
then goes on to tell me that he has two boys, one getting his degree in Chemistry, and second
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completing his MBA. He smiles when he finishes talking, clearly proud of what they have
accomplished. He adds that one of his boys even studied English medium. He leaves briefly and
returns from one of his rooms with two books. “Do you understand these?” he asks handing me
his sons’ chemistry textbook and English textbook. I look through them and Gopi turns to his
wife smiling. “See! They’re as smart as the American.”
As Gopi and I finish our tea, he asks me what caste I am. The question takes me by
surprise because it is generally considered rude to discuss caste so openly. I tell him I am of the
Kamma caste, which is one of the larger dominant castes in the state. “Wow that’s a very big
colom” he says to his wife. Colom, I learn from Gopi, is the respectability and prestige of a caste
group. He tells me he is of the BC caste group and is a Golla (aka Yadava).
Till this moment, no one in the village has mentioned anything about the SCs of the
village. I ask Gopi about them. He gets a bit serious and silent, asking me why I need to know. I
explain it’s part of my work, but still he speaks with hesitation. He begins speaking again. “They
live down the road, very nearby, but I’m sure you won’t need to go there”.
I ask him why I wouldn’t go there and he seems frustrated and surprised by my questions,
as if he doesn’t understand why I’m asking them. “Our right hands are our good hands, and our
left hand are our bad hands. We are born like this. And the left hand cannot become the right
hand. Just like that, some of us were born as the left hands and others are the right. They happen
to be the left hands.” I ask him if he goes to the SC part of the village and why it is separated
from the rest of the village. Gopi laughs and I think I have offended him. “Why are you asking
this question here? Ask this in Nathavaram where there’s a huge SC colony. They live together
and drink together and cause problems together. That’s not a question for here. Nothing bad
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happens here.” The conversation wraps up when Gopi excuses himself and retreats to his sewing
machine to finish some saris for women in the village.
The caste system dictates a social hierarchy within village communities, as well as many
inter-caste relations. Significant emphasis is placed on purity and impurity (Dumont, 1970).
These differences of purity are linked to occupational differences, ritual roles, and village
structure (Parish, 1995; Racine and Racine, 1997). This affect is seen in Gopi’s reaction to my
questions about the SC community in the village. SCs, also known as dalits or untouchables, are
considered impure. Even in Gopi’s description of caste, he uses a metaphor of hands and
describes the SCs as the left hand, the impure hand. Purity was the main influence of caste
relations within G.K. Godam, affecting not traditional considerations such as occupation, but
rather physical separation, and restricted interactions.
3.1.3 The Overlap and Divergence of Class and Caste
Class is another significant hierarchy within the village setting, often reflected by land
holdings of households. There tends to be a significant overlap between caste and class. The
overlap between caste and class can be seen when looking at the villagers participating in
NREGA, where those of non-land owning castes were more likely to participate in Andhra
Pradesh (Shankar and Gaiha, 2013). Still the hierarchies of caste and class deviate from one
another. Béteille discusses in his ethnographic account of Sripuram, that significant evolution has
occurred in these hierarchies, resulting in a “cleavage” of the caste and class relation (Béteille,
2012). Although he observes significant overlap between the two social hierarchies, upward
mobility of the lower caste has become more normal.
The overlap and divergence of caste and class is apparent in G.K. Godam. Despite Gopi’s
clear distaste for my interest in the SCs of the village, I make plans to cross the tall wooden fence
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at the edge of the village that separates the SC houses. I take Sunil with me, a local dalit and
mutual friend of Gopi and myself. Suresh comes out of his two room home and greets Sunil, a
local activist, and I with a smile. “We are family,” he says patting Suresh on the back. Later I ask
him what relation Suresh has to him. He tells me he has no idea, but they are dalits so they are
family.
During this conversation with Suresh I find out that Suresh is a land owning member of
the village, although it is only 1 acre. He tells me that he bought the land with his own money.
Gopi too only owns 1 acre of land, despite being a member of a higher caste. Behind Suresh I see
his sister sitting in one of the rooms and sewing. I can’t help but reflect one the similarities
between Gopi and Suresh, both small landowners, both use tailoring as a supplementary source
of income, both living in similarly sized homes with two rooms, and both participating in
NREGA work. Still, Gopi refuses to cross the fence as I had that day. Despite being on different
level on the caste hierarchy, Gopi and Suresh appeared to be in a similar position within the
village class hierarchy.
Across from the village temple, located in the village center, is the house of Babu Rao.
Babu Rao’s house is located on a larger compound area with a private well and a barn for the
family’s cows and goats. When there are large issues within the village, villagers turn to Babu
Rao for advice and help. I am quickly told by Gopi that Babu Rao is the peddamanshi of the
village, meaning his is a respected authority figure. Babu Rao is also of the BC caste group. In
this village there are three castes that are BC. Babu Rao is of the dominant caste within the
village, the Golla caste. The other BC castes are the Yellapi caste, and the Botalu caste.
I stand outside Babu Rao’s home waiting to be invited inside. His wife sees me and calls
me inside, having already heard about me. The neighboring women peaks her head over this wall
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separating the two houses. She asks who I am and Babu Rao’s wife tells her I’m the “foreign
girl”. The neighboring family is OC. The OC caste of the village is Kapu, one of the three
influential caste groups in the state. I quickly find out from the neighbor that the two families are
very close. “They are Gollalu and we are Kapulu, but my husband’s father and Babu Rao garu’s
father were good friends and caste didn’t matter so the two families are still good friends,” she
told me when I visited her home the next day. There appears to be a level friendliness between
the BCs and OCs of the village that is not present in their relationship with the SCs of the village.
3.2

Politics
Babu Rao arrives from his field and casually greets me. I find myself standing with he

enters his compound as a sign of respect, and sit when he motions for me to take a seat. We
begin discussing an issue I observed about land distribution in the village and improper land
ownership documents. During this conversation I discover that he is a local TDP party leader,
with former involvement with the CPI(M). CPI(M) is the Marxist communist party in AP. Gopi
is another TDP party leader in the area. Babu Rao was also the previous elected Vice President
of the panchayat. There are two villages in this panchayat, the upper village and the lower
village. The upper village, where the prior president and the current president and vice president
live, is Madhavnagar. The lower village is G.K. Godam. The prior president was also of the TDP
party and is a current TDP party leader in the area. The OC and BC members of the village are
supporters of the TDP. The SC families are supporters of the YSR party. Interestingly, the
current president of the panchayat is of the YSR party. Many of the local officials, such as the
Village Revenue Officer, are supporters of the TDP. Additionally, the current leading party of
AP is the TDP.
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3.2.1 History of Caste and Politics in AP
Politics in India is entwined with everyday life. In fact, caste is regarded as one of the
building blocks of politics and political organization in India (Kothari 1988; Weiner 1967;
Krishna, 2003). Andhra Pradesh is no exception to this phenomenon. From its creation in 1953
till 1983, Andhra Pradesh was largely dominated by the Indian National Congress (INC) party. It
was in 1983 that film star and new politician at the time, N. T. Rama Rao (NTR) established the
Telugu Desam Party (TDP). With growing unrest with the INC party and dissent for Prime
Minister Indira Gandhi, the TDP rose to power winning with NTR voted into power as the first
non-congress chief minister (CM) of Andhra Pradesh. NTR and the TDP remained in power until
1989, with the exception of a brief change in power last 31 days in 1984. It was in 1989 that INC
returned to power with the election of Marri Chenna Reddy as CM. This time Congress remained
in power until 1994, when NTR was elected into his second term. In 2004 the INC returned to
political power once more, under the leadership of Sri Y. S. Rajasekhara Reddy (YSR) by
forming a coalition with the Telangana Rashtra Samithi (TRS). The TRS party was formed in
2001 with the single point agenda of creating a separate state of Telangana from Andhra Pradesh.
The regional name for the Congress is now known as the YSR party. (Chalapathi and
Subramanyam, 2006). Throughout elections party alliances have changed. In fact, the 2004
election of the YSR party was possible because of the alliance they formed with the TRS party.
However, in the 2009 election there was a new alliance of TDP and TRS parties referred to as
the TDP Grand Alliance that allowed the TDP.
Caste and politics are also largely connected. Historically speaking, the Congress party of
Andhra Pradesh is led by Reddys. In opposition to the YSR party, the TDP party is historically
led by members of the Kamma caste. These two upper caste dominate the state of Andhra and
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the two leading political parties. A third dominant caste in the state are the Kapus. Similar to
much of the voting population in Andhra, the Kapus were had increased dissent for the Congress
party and aligned with the TDP party. Kapus also joined the Kamma in the TDP party as a way
of breaking the reign of Reddy CMs. Although traditionally the smaller population OCs or
forward castes dominated the political sphere, the emergence of the TDP as a political
counterpoint to the Reddy-dominated Congress Party drew BCs to the TDP. BCs were able to
use this relation to enter the political sphere and use their involvement to challenge traditional
land-owning Reddys in rural area. BCs also found themselves able to use political power and
influence to their benefit. After election of NTR, Kapus felt marginalized by Kammas. NTR was
known to openly give fellow Kammas higher powers in office. Later the Kapus switched support
to the YSR party.
Politics in India, and the subsequent caste alliance associated reveal much background
necessary to understanding the complexity of Indian life at the village level. An ethnographic
study by Carolyn Elliott of the 2009 assembly elections of Andhra Pradesh reveal the alliances of
parties and caste groups. During this time Other Category castes (OC) such as the dominated
Kammas aligned with the TDP party. Significant portions of the BC population also aligned. The
YSR party was still supported by the Reddy population, but also gathered significant support
from members of Scheduled Castes (SC) and Scheduled Tribes (ST). It was also during these
elections that the TDP received support from the Telugu Rashtra Samithi (TRS) party in an effort
to capture more BC votes, after understanding that the Kamma base was not large enough for
victory. It was also during these elections that prominent Telugu film star Konidala Chiranjeevi
and the Praja Rajyam Party (PRP) he founded in 2008 became significantly more active. The
film star, of the Kapu caste, tried to capture Kapu votes. Kapus are considered BC in parts of the
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state. Chiranjeevi attempted to use this connection to appeal to BC groups. The TDP Grand
Alliance was also joined by the two communist parties of CPI and CPI(M), due to their
opposition of the national Congress government’s 2008 nuclear deal with the U.S. (Elliott,
2012).
Tensions between caste and political parties run high, especially between those castes
that align with the TDP or YSR (Gundimeda, 2009). This tension between the two parties can be
seen at the village level as well. During another visit with Babu Roa regarding the same land
issue, Manga a local BC woman enters Babu Rao’s compound. Manga is a single mother who
gets her income from various coolie jobs. She calls Babu Rao, anna meaning brother and a sign
of familiarity and respect. She inquiries about a new job at the local government school cleaning
the bathroom. Babu Rao is unsure what this position is about, but Manga explains that she’s
already talked to the teacher who didn’t know what to do. Then she even talked to Gopi. Gopi
had assured her he would try to find out more and talk to the president, but still she hasn’t got
any information of what to do. She even brings up that this position has been filled in
Madhavnagar. Babu Rao is surprised that she brought this issue to Gopi and that Gopi did not tell
him. He asks another man walking by his house to bring Gopi. Soon Gopi arrives and Babu Rao
questions why he did not bring this issue to his attention. Gopi said that he was inquiring about
the issue himself and had not heard back about what to do so he did not bring it up with him.
Babu Roa emphasizes that they are both part of the same group and party, and he is sad Gopi
didn’t bring this up with him. Babu Rao turns to Manga and promises to look into this position.
It later comes out in conversation with Babu Rao and other TDP members of the village
that this position is a “TDP position” that may disappear when the state party changes it’s best to
use it to help supporters of the TDP. He says that it is up to the village to nominate people for
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this position. He then comments on how Manga is a good woman, but has a bad reputation in the
village. This reputation began when she fed drunk YSR party members in front of her home one
night for money.
3.3

Patronage and Colonial Legacy
Babu Rao in many way demonstrates characteristics of a patron or headmen classically

described in village ethnographies, the leader of a village (Witsoe, 2013; Srinivasa 1976; Mathur,
2012). However, to understand the significance of the headman in the social dynamics of a
village, the zamindari system must also be understood. The zamindari system was a system of
control within villages, in which local landlords had significant power over the peasants who
farmed on their land. The system of land owning and tenant farms largely resulted in “insecure
tenancies, concentrated ownership, great inequality of land holdings, prevalence of tiny
uneconomic holdings, and fragmentation of holdings” which largely characterized the agrarian
structure (Veeraraghavan, 2015; 18). Indirect rule was a popular form of governance by the
British, in which areas were ruled by Indians rather than directly by the British Crown, often
with reliance on local elites and landowners. Regions of India under indirect rule were still under
British control, however, they also enjoyed considerable autonomy in matters of how they were
administered internally, with the exception of regulation on warfare and armed forces, as well as
enforced annual tribute obligations to the British governments in the form of taxes (Banerjee and
Iyer, 2005). One method implemented for collection was through local land lords as collection
intermediates utilizing the pre-existing zamindari system. Once the tribute was paid to the British
Crown, the land lord was free to keep any extra he was able to collect (Iyer, 2010). Zamindaris
continued to have significant economic power as well as political power through the support they
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received from the British. Many of these zamindaris were of the upper caste, such as Kammas of
Andhra Pradesh whose traditional caste based role is cultivator.
The British further legitimized the power of large land lord with significant changes to
agricultural policy in the 18th century. Policy such as the Permanent Settlement Act gave the
rights to own land to land lords, rather than to the cultivators of the land, creating a class of
absentee landlords, increasing dependence of the cultivators to the land lord due to financial
dependence (Bhalla, 2007; Veeraraghavan, 2015). This power that land lords had lent to their
role as patrons to reliant villager clients, the most dependent of whom were of lower castes and
classes.
This relationship of patronage developed further with the creation of the village headmen
as an elected position within the Indian government. Patronage relationships allowed the
headmen to provide for his clients in exchange for votes and political loyalty. Election of
powerful patrons as headmen was made possible by their influence on villagers within their
community, as well as their connectivity to the larger political sphere. Influential patrons, such as
the headmen, have the influence of controlling voter populations (Srinivas, 1976; Witsoe, 2013).
The previously mentioned caste-based mobilization, both vertically and horizontally, by patrons
and caste leaders, have been crucial influences on political outcome throughout India. The
patrons such as headmen have influence on members of their caste, horizontally, as well as those
outside their caste reliant on them as clients, vertically. This influence is used during election
processes (Rudolph and Rudolph 1984). In addition to controlling the voter population for their
political benefit, patrons are able to control the population votes for higher level government
officials. Votes can be used as a currency with higher level politicians, again used for the benefit
of the patron. The role of zamindaris and headmen, demonstrate how economic, political, and
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caste based advantages are intertwined and allow systems of patronage at the village level. In the
spirit of clientalism, the villagers reliant on their patron receive something in turn for their
loyalty. I later find out that Manga did not get the job. In fact, the job goes to Gopi’s wife, and
Gopi is a supporter of the TDP and Babu Rao and client of local patron Babu Rao.
Such village level dynamics are crucial to consider in any development efforts, especially
since development has been on India’s agenda since its conception as an independent nation.
Nehru’s envisioned an India of development, however his vision and the absence of results at the
village level prove again the influence of local land lords/headmen and the influence they
continue to have in contemporary India. Relationships of patronage and power born from the
colonial legacy of indirect rule and the zamindari system result in the suffering of redistributive
policy in India. Initially, the leading party of the nation, the Congress party and their
development agenda dominated at both the state and the national levels, but the influence of the
headmen and their self-interest resulted in diminished effects of programs at the village level.
Influence of local voting allowed the headmen to pressurize state level government officials; in
affect little was done by these actors to enforce village level projects. In fact, this is one of the
largest criticisms of the Nehruvian developmental state, which critics characterize as culturally
inappropriate and therefore, weak. They argue that the elite bureaucrats and planners treated
society as a single population to be targeted for policy implementation, however lower-level state
personnel took part in a different culture (Elliott, 2012). As Kaviraj notably commented on the
cultural difference between India’s liberal state, and conservative hierarchy and power dynamics
bound to rural life. The introduction of liberal innovative policy contradicting the village context
introduced the need for such policy to be vernacularized to the rural setting, India’s “feet of
vernacular clay” as Kaviraj phrases this difference.
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3.4

Summary
Contradictions between state and society, cause the need of intermediates between the

boundary between the two, a culture gap bridged by patrons such as headmen, and affiliated
brokers (Gupta, 1995; Witsoe, 2012). India’s shift to rights-based development and policy was
an attempt to bypass the reliance on local elites and create a link of demand and fulfillment
between the poor and the larger state government (Veeraraghavan, 2015). Despite the new
emphasis on demand by the poor, the power of these intermediaries such as headmen persists.
The NREGA program is no exception to such obstacles to effectiveness.
Such village systems of patronage, social hierarchies, and accompanying power dynamics
are the cause of what is termed “corruption”, the same “corruption” that higher level government
policy developers saw as the culprit of the failure of previous programs. Therefore, to fully
understand rights-based policy such as NREGA it is crucial to understand interactions within the
village context, and such contributing factors such as politics and caste. These few interactions
described in this chapter demonstrate the relative role of caste and politics in the village context
of G.K. Godam, and show how caste and politics are intertwined in everyday life. They will
continue to play an important role in any discussion of NREGA and program implementation.
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Chapter 4: The Realities of NREGA
The social hierarchies and systems of patronage and brokerage characterize village life in
India. Historically, such systems have been reinforced by colonialism, legacies of indirect rule,
and the overall prevalence and influence of the caste system. The effect of such factors culminate
in the power dynamic structured postcolonial village seen today. Such a village environment
characterizes life in G.K. Godam, just as it does in many villages across India as shown by the
similarities of such phenomenon in the many village studies and ethnographies conducted
(Witsoe 2013, Veeraraghavan 2015, Béteille, 2012, Piliavsky, 2014). Thus, it is not surprising
that such embedded systems affect how villagers experience NREGA.
Attempts have been made by NREGA in AP to bypass lower level elected officials and
the failures of the gram sabha. Workers submit their demand forms to centrally appointed FA’s
rather than to gram panchayats or the sarpanch. The system of social audits is intended to reduce
corruption and the exploitation of workers. In trying to bypass elected officials, the policy tries to
bypass the role of politics in NREGA implementation. Still, the significance of patronage
systems and politics persists. In fact, workers encounter many barriers to NREGA, which are
both caused and exasperated by systems of patronage and village power dynamics. Such barriers
inhibit workers from pursuing solutions on their own, further driving them to pursue help from
local patrons and brokers. This chapter will explore specifically the realities of NREGA,
demonstrating in what ways it differs from, as well as follows official NREGA guidelines of AP
as discussed in Chapter 2.
4.1

Administrative and Technological Barriers
In addition to political and historical loyalties of workers to local patrons, administrative

NREGA barriers exist as obstacles to workers trying to solve problems alone. Such obstacles
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drive them to further seek the help of intermediaries such as patrons and brokers. Administrative
barriers include general administrative apathy, biometric technology barriers, and barriers of
awareness regarding NREGA operation and rights.
4.1.1 Administrative Apathy and Hiding Behind the Computer
“Hiding behind the computer” is a phenomenon commented on in fieldwork conducted
by PhD candidate Rajesh Veeraraghavan (Veeraraghavan, 2015: 36). This occurs when workers
encounter technical excuses by NREGA administration. The excuse commonly being that the
computers are slow or the system is too busy. In his experiences workers would complain that
FAs declare that they were not given work because the computer had not assigned the workers
work. He continues to explain that in fact many of these cases were less rooted in technical
difficulties, but in ongoing conflicts between the FA and workers (Veeraraghavan, 2015).
In my initial visits to G.K. Godam I attended village meetings with Sunil, a local activist.
During one meeting a man described to us his interaction with this phenomenon of
administration hiding behind the computer. He had taken the day off work and went to the
mandal office to request a new job card. Instead of receiving the help he required, he was met
with the excuse that the system was down and that he’d get the job card the following day.
Office employees assured him that they would give it to his FA. He tells us he had little faith he
would get it from the FA. In fact, he did not receive the job card for a month. Giving up on trying
to get the card himself, the worker approached Sunil and soon after the problem was resolved.
Similarly, he could have approached local patrons and brokers, just as many other villagers in a
similar situation would have.
I spent a significant amount of time traveling with Sunil back and forth to the local
mandal offices. These mandal offices house the offices of many of the lower level administrators
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of NREGA, such as the MDO, APO, and COs. In many ways, it functions as the headquarters of
all NREGA employees. Even all FAs, stationed in panchayats, report to the mandal center for
weekly meetings. When I enter the mandal area I am quickly recognized as the American
researcher. I’m greeted with a respect and geniality that many of the workers coming into the
office fail to receive. The disparity between our reception is obvious. On one occasion I walked
into the CO office to observe specifically what the COs do, and how they interact with workers
that come into the office. I walk into the office and am immediately greeted by the CO, a women
dressed neatly in a clean sari with long braided hair decorated with fresh flowers. She smiles as
she stands up to say, “namaste”.
She then adjusts the fan in the office to face me and asks if I would like some tea. After I
kindly refused she calls one of the office assistants in and asks him to bring her a tea. She then
proceeds to talk to an FA helping her with the computers that afternoon. When the tea arrives she
takes her time to finish the glass. During this time, I’ve noticed a man waiting outside the office.
Only after she has finished her chatting and her tea did she call the man inside the office. I make
the connection that this man has come to the office to handle a NREGA problem and he himself
is an NREGA worker.
He entered the office and stands in the corner while the CO continues to remain seated
behind her desk. His hands are folded over his chest, and he slouches as he maintains eye contact
with the floor, a position lacking all confidence. Raising his head slightly he asks the CO about
his issue of correcting the information entered in the NREGA system. This man has been unable
to receive payments through NREGA due to an incorrectly enter Aadhar card number, an error
that is all too common in the area. The CO doesn’t appear to be giving him her full attention.
Instead, she continues to look at her computer screen and abrasively tells him she’ll take care of
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it. The man asks when it will be done. She dismisses him from the office harshly saying, “come
tomorrow!”
On another occasion of workers approaching lower NREGA administration, husbands
and their wives had been going for 3 weeks looking to add their wives to their job cards. Despite
repeated efforts, 3 weeks had passed and the wives still had not been added to the household job
cards. It’s clear to see how and why reliance on intermediaries persists. Typically, after an
intermediary is approached the issue is resolved within a couple days. The frustration with the
lower level administration is clear when talking to villagers. One husband exclaimed, “They
don’t pay attention to us! Always too busy doing nothing! So lazy. You have to know someone
to get anything done”.
The difference between the treatment I received, the greeting, chair, fan, an offer of tea,
compared to the irritation, apathy, and general disregard for the NREGA worker waiting for
assistance is representative of the general treatment workers receive when they come to the
NREGA office to handle problems themselves. This general disregard for workers is apparent in
the amount of time it takes workers to accomplish the work that intermediaries, such as brokers
and patrons, can accomplish in a significantly shorter period of time.
4.1.2 Deviation from the Operation Manual Guidelines
Deviation from manual guidelines and the ineffective implementation of safeguards, may
not themselves be corrupt behavior, but create an NREGA program more prone to exploitative
corrupt behavior. One such ignorance of safeguards that I witnessed on multiple occasions was
the mismanagement of muster rolls, a safeguard that has massive potential of both transparency
and accountability.
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During one of my first visits to a field site there was no muster roll. I approached the FA
and asked him why he was recording all the names in a notebook instead and he responded, “My
wife did not give me the muster roll”. After seeing the look of confusion on my face he said,
“My wife is the FA, but she is ill so I have come in to do her job”. So the we had assumed was
the “FA” was not in fact the FA, but rather her husband who lacked all the training she had
receive for the position. I talk to the workers at this site during their break. Noka Raju, one of the
workers says, “the FA hasn’t visited the site in a couple weeks. He says she is ill”. Rama
Lakshmi, another activist with me, is upset at the lack of NREGA compliance and demands to
speak to the FA. When she hears only the FA’s husband is here, she threatens to report them if
they continue to take attendance on regular paper.
On another occasion, I was traveling with the APO on his regular field visits. We rode his
motorcycle across the fields. He explains that this area is not really meant for driving, but he will
not make me walk the distance. After struggling to drive through the ditches and mud we finally
reach the site. The workers are digging a cheru, watershed. I see that there are no muster rolls at
this site either and am surprised to see the APO taking no action on the issue. He explained that
the physical muster rolls were not sent in so all the mates are keeping track of attendance in their
own books. The FA is directly documenting the work into the online system on his smart phone,
which is given to all FAs in AP by the government. Because of low connectivity, many wait until
they have connection to do this. Since there were no physical muster rolls, the FA was directly
entering them onto the system.
Although the act specifies that the muster roll should be maintained by the FA and mates,
there are many situations where this is not followed. Workers are still getting work and payment,
however the danger of the program functioning in this way is that the safeguard that is the
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physical muster roll is not present. The mismanagement of muster rolls opens NREGA to an
increased possibility of corruption.
4.1.3 Biometric Identification: A Technological Barrier
Besides the interaction workers have with technology through administration, the direct
interactions workers themselves have with biometric identifiers provides another barrier for
NREGA work, a technological barrier. Unlike many other states, AP has implemented the use of
biometric finger print recognition to prevent fraudulent behavior and confirm that workers are
receiving the payments there are entitled. The flaw in such a system is that the heavy manual
labor workers engage in often result in unrecognizable finger prints. In many conversations I
have had with workers they express the great difficulty they have in receiving the alternative iris
scan. Without some successful biometric identification, they will be unable to receive their
payments. One man in G.K. Godam stopped participating in NREGA work entirely, because he
was receiving no money. The lack of access to iris scanner is yet another difficulty with
technology workers face and one to which there is a slow response from administration. Again,
reliance on local patrons to resolve such and issue is not surprising.
4.1.4 NREGA Awareness
Another common barrier is the barrier of general awareness of NREGA entitlements.
This barrier is explored by Drèze and Khera, however, I witness little of this barrier during my
fieldwork (Drèze and Khera, 2011). High levels of NREGA awareness by worker can be
attributed largely to action taken by activists in AP. Activists, including Sunil, were able to
provide training sessions to youths who were expected to participate in NREGA. The intention
of which was that they would spread the information to other members of their community. In
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addition, Sunil participated in a bicycle campaign in which he and other local youths distributed
informational pamphlets regarding NREGA and workers’ entitlements according to the act.
Continual awareness regarding the program has also been achieved through a phone relay
system, pioneered by technological activist Vivek Srinivasan. With such a system, prominent AP
activist leader Ajay Kumar can relay new NREGA developments to all workers subscribed to the
system. Such a system is simplistic in nature and free for workers to use, and insures updated
levels of awareness amongst NREGA participants.
AP has high levels of awareness, however the lack of awareness of rights and
entitlements in areas lacking the presence of such activists can present another barrier to workers
and their navigation of NREGA. Further, such a barrier can make workers more prone to
exploitation within systems of patronage.
Administration related barriers workers encounter within the NREGA structure and
official functioning make it frustrating and nearly impossible for workers to navigate. This is
especially true considering the lost opportunity cost workers incur when they have to take the
day off from engaging in work to go to the NREGA offices. This is in addition to the cost they
incur to travel to the mandal center to get to the NREGA offices. Other barriers workers can
incur are social and political barriers, outside the official NREGA administration and structural
barrier discussed.
4.2

Social and Political Barriers
Administrative and technological barriers interfere with the ability of NREGA to

navigate NREGA and handle problems they may be encountering. In addition to being driven
toward systems of patronage for solving such problems, social and political barriers within
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communities and NREGA result in additional difficulties incurred by workers that further drive
them to patrons and brokers.
4.2.1 Who gets work?
Such social and political barriers can cause some workers to be given work preference
over others, infringing on the basic stipulation of the NREGA legislation entitling all to work by
their demand. Officials, mates, and workers within groups are all guilty of having preference for
workers.
The APO of the mandal happened to be a good friend of Sunil’s. Interesting in seeing
more of what he did, I took a day to travel with the APO on his duties of checking on NREGA
work sites. After visiting a few worksites, we rode his motorcycle through Madhavnager. He told
me he wanted to investigate a potential new worksite. This was interesting because the EC and
TA should be the official people to investigate a new site, and this was not at all in the official
description of the APO’s position. We reach a school building near the entrance of the village
and are met by a large older man walking with the assistance of two younger men. He was also
followed by a two other middle aged me. This man was dressed in all white, donning a white
lungi (a wrap with a white fabric) and short sleeved button up shirt. I find out later that he was
the old sarpanch of the area and current TDP member.
He approaches the APO and guides us into the school grounds. They both look towards
the mess in front of use, a school ground covered in rough rocks and plants. The APO
understands immediately what is wanted of him. The sarpanch would like to use NREGA work
to clean up the government school grounds. The APO is really keen on having this work done.
He turns to the sarpanch and says, “Let’s put a few good people here to do this work and get it
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done.” The sarpanch agrees and says, “Yes. Some strong men who are not too old. Can this
work be done with NREGA?”
“Look I’m doing this because I like you. I would even do this with my own money. We’ll
get this done somehow because it’s a school, but it might not get approved for NREGA,” the
APO replies. In fact, the work was not funded through NREGA and the APO paid for the work
himself. Despite the good intentions of the APO, the intentions of only providing this work to
young strong male NREGA workers entails that those who do not fit the description do not
receive work. Although the act doesn’t discriminate by skill, the APO and sarpanch
demonstrated in this interaction the barrier to receiving work that the elderly, weak, and women
may have by failing to fit the description of young strong males.
Party preferences can also have an effect on who receives work through NREGA.
NREGA administrators are frequently transferred as a method of minimized local connections
that can lead to collusion between administrators and local members for the purpose of engaging
in corrupt behavior. In another effort to reduce local influence on administrators and NREGA
officials, the positions are appointed centrally rather than through local elections. The intentions
of this move to appoint all the lower-level bureaucrats rather than relying on local elections was
an attempt by the AP government to separate local politics from the operation of the program.
Still, the political positons of all these lower-level bureaucrats was known by everyone in the
area. For example, the political affiliation of the FA in the Madhavnagar panchayat, the
panchayat the G.K. Godam was a part of, was the TDP. The tensions and frequent disagreements
between her and the sarpanch were also locally known to be connected to the sarpanch’s support
for the TDP opposing YSR party.
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Party affiliations exist, despite structural program features to prevent this, and affect
interactions between lower-level bureaucrats and workers. During one conversation with workers
I discovered that they had previous problems with not receiving work due their support of the
YSR party. The local FA was a supporter of the TDP. Raju was sure of the connection between
political party and receiving work because all the BC groups, in which a majority supported
TDP, were given work. The SC groups in which a majority supported the YSR had immense
difficulty receiving work. When they did receive work they would then “have to struggle to get
the payments,” according to Raju. Raju and his mother, an elderly NREGA workers smile as
Raju says, “thankfully, [the FA] was suspended for taking bribes from those same TDP
workers”. Sunil, the activist, tells me that he helped them bring this issue up during the last social
audit. The FA was taking bribes from the TDP workers so they could claim to be doing work
when they were not.
Issues of party preferences invade groups and workers as well, especially when group
members of different parties are mixed into one group. Generally, this is avoided because groups
are separated according to caste. Sunil justifies this saying that there are “fewer problems that
way”. The connection between caste and politics is clear, in which SC members largely support
the YSR party, and BC members largely support the TDP. In G.K. Godam there are a total of 5
SC households. With 7 eligible SCs participating in NREGA work it is not feasible to have a
separate SC group from the BC group. Therefore, G.K. Godam provides an interesting case in
which one group has mixed SC and BC members.
Due to the interrelation between caste and politics, the inter-caste group also happens to
be interparty. During my stay in G.K. Godam there was no lack of politics in discussion. On a
couple occasions NREGA workers would complain that they felt some of the party members
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were getting paid more because they were TDP, the same party that the FA supported. Such
payment disparity by party preference unfortunately does not surprise me. In fact, the FA had
also been accusing of party preference in another occasion. In this situation TDP leaders in the
village happened to be mates working with the FA to fraudulently claim their groups had
worked, when in fact they had not. The payment that the groups had received were distributed to
each worker in those groups. The TA supposed to measure how much work was done, and the
FA supposed to supervise NREGA work were also paid. The mates are speculated to have
benefitted by keeping a large portion of the payment amount themselves. Again, the bases of this
collusion was political affiliations.
In another village the FA was found to give similar preference and benefit to groups who
supported YSR, the party he happened to support. In this situation mates were creating groups in
which their family members were included. However, when it came time to working they would
claim their family members worked when in fact they were not even at the worksite. The FA,
whose duty it is to insure this fraud does not happen, was said to have looked the other way
because the mate was YSR. The mate would then claim the payment of his family members. Due
to the piece wise payment methods of AP, work done by each group is measured daily and the
members of the group are all paid the same amount reflecting the work done by the group. When
members of the group don’t participate, the overall amount of work done is expected to be less.
This means that the act of claiming members working when they did not actually take money
away from those actually doing the work. Other members in the group had a problem with such
actions because they are being paid less as a result. The piece-wise and group system, intended to
incentivize groups to work harder and motivate each other, actually provides a tool with which
those not working can abuse.
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Other intergroup issues with the piece-wise system arise between younger and older
workers. During one conversation I have with Gopi he said, “It’s difficult because they are
weaker and slower, and because of them everyone gets paid less”. Sunil explained that
sometimes he is able to talk groups into taking an elderly person, but giving them the role of
watching children or bringing water instead of doing the assigned work. The remaining able
workers work and the payment is distributed among the entire group based on the piece-wise
payment system. Overall the group will be able to complete less work, however, they have
decided to receive less payment to help the older members of their community. However, when
such agreement within a group is unable to occur, the older members struggle to be included in
groups and struggle to complete assigned manual labor through NREGA.
4.3

Perception of Workers as Lazy
NREGA work is characterized by intensive unskilled labor, however many non-workers

involved with NREGA perceive NREGA workers as lazy. This perception may dictate many of
the relations between those participating in NREGA work and those not participating in NREGA
work such as administration and landowners who may be involved in providing NREGA work.
The land lords influence may in fact go beyond NREGA as they may behave as local patron, the
same patron that workers interact with for NREGA related issues as well as issues outside
NREGA.
Unlike other states, AP offers subsidized NREGA labor to small land for their land.
Despite the high levels of awareness in the area, if workers are asked what NREGA is they will
say they do not know. Instead, they refer to the work colloquially as cheru pani, which translates
to watershed work. This name is reflective of the type of work most available through NREGA,
watershed projects which largely occur on private land.

77

Still there are hesitations by farmers to use NREGA labor. There is the perception that
NREGA workers are lazy. One morning during my stay in G. K. Godam I was walking into the
village to join the regular morning women’s gossiping group by the village well. I was living
right outside the entrance to the village. As I passed the entrance I ran in to Manikum, Babu
Rao’s brother. Manikum was on his way into his family’s field. The brothers collectively
cultivated 8 acres of land and today Manikum was going in to make sure his crops were getting
the appropriate amount of water. I ask to join him and he laughs, “Why would you want to do
that?”. I explain that I am just interested in seeing his fields. Again he chuckles and begins
walking. I take this as my signal to follow him. His fields are located behind the house I am
staying in. As we walk into the field he laughs again watching me struggle to walk on the narrow
paths separating crops. “Once I took the madams in to the field just like this. She was so
interested in seeing the land. She even took pictures!” The madam he was referring to was the
teacher who’s room I was staying in in the village. She was from Vizag, the largest city in the
Vishakhapatnam district. It’s amusing to him how interested all the “city women” are interested
in agriculture.
After a brief trek we finally make it to the center of his land. He shows me the irrigation
trenches between the plots of land, and drops a rock in the trench, deviating the flow of water
from the neighboring plot back to his. He explains, “We have an arrangement. We share the
water and alternate every other day.” I ask him if he dug the trenches himself and he says, “Of
course! I do all the work on my land”. “All the work?” I ask for clarification. “We get coolies to
do some of the planting and harvesting, but I am here as well helping”. He then returns to talking
about the irrigation. “At first I tried to have these trenches dug by that government program.”
“With cheru pani?” I ask to confirm. “Yes that. But see this section?” He points to a section of
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the irrigation in which tall grass has regrown. “This is the work they did. Water cannot flow that
well. Then I finished the rest” he says showing me the anther section in which there was very
little grass growing. “That’s why I don’t use them to do this work. They do it badly.”
This is a common perception of NREGA work conducted on private land and leads to
significant hesitation. Even Veeraraghavan recognizes this perception of workers held by land
holder. I was curious as to how Manikum’s family was able to get NREGA work on their private
land as their holding exceed 5 acres. I find out that the brothers have separate ownership
documents, each for 2 acres of land, therefore they all qualify for NREGA work. Babu Rao’s
family owned the most land in the village.
NREGA offers this labor as a method of offsetting the burdens on small landlords of
increased employment wages that accompany the minimum wage promised to workers through
NREGA work. According to Veeraraghavan, large land lords did not utilize NREGA work
because they did not qualify. The increase in wages resulting from NREGA minimum was not
particularly disastrous to them because of their overall greater wealth. Still, it is expected that
there is some opposition from local land lords, as they too are affected by the expectation by
workers for higher wages. Such large landholders have been documented by Veeraraghavan as
having opposition to NREGA, claiming it actually made worker who participated lazier.
This perception of laziness is also helped by the NREGA lower administration. It most
likely contributes to their limited and abrasive interactions with workers, as demonstrated by the
earlier example of the CO. The APO hold weekly meetings with all the FAs of the mandal.
During this meeting he updates them on what is happening within their office and the larger
NREGA world of the state or country. The APO also uses this meeting to gather information and
input from the FAs on what is happening in their panchayats. During one such meeting one of
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the FAs brought up that the mates of his village would like to have more than 100 days of work.
The other FAs immediately smirk and chuckle. One of them comments, “they probably want
higher wages too!” Now they all laugh at the joke. A common request during my village visits
was also to have more work and possible higher wages. Another FA jumps in and take the joke
even further adding, “net they’ll want no work and pay!” Everyone seems to be enjoying this
joke with full laughter until the APO interrupts to refocus the meeting. Still the humor they
found in the request by workers exemplifies the perception they have of NREGA workers, as
lazy villagers.
This lazy perception of workers by landowners and NREGA administration affects
relationships they have with workers. It can be expected that this perception of workers causes
much of the way administration behaves with workers, such as the CO discussed earlier. Further,
the disinterest of distaste large landlords have for NREGA work and the associated wage
increase may cause general dislike toward NREGA worker, displayed instead as distaste for
laziness. Both contribute to the struggle NREGA workers have in navigating the program.
4.4

NREGA and Patronage
Local land lords can also be the patrons which NREGA workers approach for resolutions

to problems. Although Babu Rao claims he has no relation to NREGA work, his family did
pursue NREGA work and chose to not continue because of the poor quality of work they felt
resulted. Still, it would not be surprising that Babu Rao has some relation with NREGA problem
solving on behalf of workers. In fact, on one occasion I had discovered a land documentation
issue within the village. The issue was stopping numerous small landowners from receiving low
interest loans for agricultural purposes. When I approached Gopi with this issue, he immediately
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said that we needed to discuss this with Babu Rao. Gopi feared handling the big issues himself.
In fact, he clearly stated that all big issues have to be dealt with through Babu Rao.
In Chapter 3 I introduced Manga’s issue of employment and Gopi’s involvement. When
Gopi tried to deal with the Manga’s issue of employment without consulting Babu Rao, Babu
Rao had clear anger and disappointment. When he confronted Gopi, Gopi’s fear was apparent as
he stumbled over his words trying to excuse his actions. The influence of a local patron like
Babu Rao goes further into his influence on the community. On many occasions when he was in
need of something it was easy for him to order anyone passing by and they would handle it
immediately. During one of our meetings he stopped someone walking by to tell them to pick up
his granddaughter from school. Within 10 minutes she was home. Still he questioned what took
so long and the man responded promptly with an explanation. Another day my pen ran out of ink
during our meeting and a passerby on his way to work was called to go buy another one for me. I
was holding a new pen within a couple minutes, and the worker continued on his way to the
fields to work. The list of demands he was able to make and the quick response and lack of
hesitation people had in complying made the influence he had within the village clear. Further,
his influence as a patron is evident in Gopi’s wife receiving the bathroom cleaning job, a clear
indicator of clientism.
4.5

Summary
The struggles NREGA workers encounter are barriers to their navigation of NREGA.

Even more importantly, such barriers drive them to rely more on the systems of patronage and
associated brokerage. These struggles are themselves influenced by caste, class, and politics and
define many aspects of everyday village life. The patrons are the intermediates between the
workers and the state. The “state” in this case being local NREGA administration workers and
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patrons interact with. When the situation is viewed from the perspective of the workers’, patrons
and brokers are essential to how they experience NREGA, and the larger state. The influential
role that patrons can have within NREGA and the associated NREGA problems provides patrons
further leverage with which to influence the action of their clients, the workers.
As Witsoe’s article describes, often times brokers exist in this politically charged
environments. These politically-connected brokers and patrons mediate many people’s access to
larger state institutions with what he terms “political mediations”. In many ways, patrons such as
Babu Rao embody this role of politically-connected intermediaries. He has considerable
influence on how people interact with the state and access state institutions. Many workers
approach intermediates such as patrons and brokers as a method of handling the struggles and
barrier they encounter with NREGA. Such methods often contribute to further clientalistic
relationships with patrons, or other further exploitation of workers through cash payments.
However, in the village of G.K. Godam, as well as other villages in the Nathavaram mandal an
alternative intermediate exists, an activist named Sunil. Sunil provides workers with a nonexploitative alternative to patron and broker intermediates, through which workers still access
state institutions, but can additionally access rights and citizenship through NREGA.
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Chapter 5: Sunil
With the involvement of clientism and brokerage in the exploitation of rural poor
workers, and the subsequent loss of access to NREGA benefits by the workers, it is not
surprising that activists such as Sunil, who provide an alternative route with no exploitative
intentions, facilitate a better functioning and less corrupt version of the NREGA program. As we
will see in this chapter, the day-to-day operation of NREGA is able to function with reduced
corruption with the involvement of activists such as Sunil. These activists police the operation of
the program for misuse, and ensure that NREGA fulfills its promise of providing an employment
safety net for the rural poor. However, if you search NREGA policy for a description of this
highly integral position it would be nowhere to be found. Rather, Sunil fulfills an unofficial
intermediate role, mediating this rights-based policy as well as its subsequent effects.
5.1

Auditors not Activists
The AP government created social auditors to provide and alternative route by which

villagers could vocalize problems, as well as increasing transparency and accountability within
panchayats, intending to accomplish what the gram sabha and panchayat raj system were unable
to. Still, as Rajesh Veeraraghavan comments, these auditors, originating from a history of activist
auditors in MKSS movements, were not activists and failed to see themselves as such
(Veeraraghavan, 2015). In official rhetoric, portrayed during training sessions Veeraraghavan
witnessed, auditors were told to view themselves as activists. This differed from how the auditors
viewed themselves. In one auditor meeting Veeraraghavan saw no auditors raise their hand when
they were asked by a senior auditor whether they saw themselves as activists. Such is the
drawback of the institutionalized social auditing process of Andhra Pradesh NREGA. Even
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former MKSS activists and current director of social audits in AP recognizes this as a drawback
of the institutionalized auditors. She tells Veeraraghavan:
“When I compare MKSS and AP, [there are few similarities] except for the fact that we
have state support, we get information really easily, and we have public hearing and some
form of follow-up action. I think what is missing from our side is that real streak of
activism. MKSS will never ever compromise on going and eating at a worker’s house.
We never do that. No matter how difficult it is individually, they go to each house and
eat, whereas I have not been able to enforce it at all: no matter how much I pushed them,
saying each person should eat in a laborer’s house. That’s what makes the personal
connection. But that’s not what happened. I don’t think it is just a question of scale. It is
also a mindset. You also feel sarkari hai [part of the government]. Since they feel sarkari
they prefer to each in a hotel. That is something that bothers me.”
(Veeraraghavan, 2015)
The ability to relate to workers, behave as non-governmentalized forces, and exercise
power during investigations against local officials are characteristics that unfortunately many
auditors lack or hesitate to exercise, but that activists have plenty of. It would be incorrect for me
to not comment on the successes of the social auditing. This process has significantly improved
the experience of NREGA beneficiaries, and is thought to have reduced rates of corruption
within NREGA. Still certain power comes with the involvement of activists, such as Sunil.
5.2

Who is Sunil?
I met Sunil soon after I arrived to India. Although I hadn’t expected to spend as much

time with him as I had, in many ways my first day in India set me up to meet such a grassroots
level activist. I arrived at the airport in the Vishakhapatnam district to a typical suffocating
humid summer afternoon. Ajay Kumar, leader of activist organization APVVU, arrived to pick
me up accompanied by Uncle Rajesh, prominent industrialist of the area and my father’s college
friend. After scrambling to collect my oversized suitcases, I trudged my weighty cart out of the
crowded airport to meet them. I learned later that industrialists and activists like Ajay Kumar
don’t typically get along. Any evidence of tension between them eased as they saw me, but I
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expected that there was a high level of tension in the hour they had spent waiting. Ajay Kumar
greets me with an unreserved smile, eager to both take me to his home and to get away from
Rajesh. Rajesh looks ready to jump into his chauffeured car and retreat to his quiet airconditioned three story house in the gated community of Garden City. I could not have been met
by two more opposite individuals. The pairing is so unlikely and uncomfortable that I only
considered few topics of conversations “safe” and unlikely to cause an argument between them.
Thinking weather was safe to discuss I attempted to break tensions by commenting how it was
very hot. Even this lead to comments by Ajay Kumar about pollution and global warming, a
subtle jab and Rajesh’s involvement with steel factories and the release of such pollution. Ajay
Kumar follows his comments with chuckles, clearly aware of the effects of his statements.
Rajesh tells me that I must have breakfast at his home before “leaving civilization”,
referring to my accommodations in a village for the next month. After a quiet breakfast followed
by a quick tour of his home, Rajesh takes Ajay and I on a tour of his neighborhood. “See we live
just like in the U.S.,” Rajesh tells me while commenting on the clean and newly paved roads.
“This is development. See this worker?” he says pointing to an elderly man dressed in rags
sweeping the sidewalk. “He gets paid well, and lives well.” Ajay, clearly upset, tries to say
nothing as Rajesh walks ahead of us in his newly ironed designer dress shirt. Rajesh tried many
times to convince me to stay with him here in his large home rather than in a dalit home in
Nathavaram. Ajay Kumar and I are prepared to leave to Ajay’s home. “You should come back
soon. You can understand how they live here from the air-conditioning,” Rajesh said, trying once
more to convince me to stay. Such was my first real introduction to the disparity between
members of the urban middle class, such as Rajesh, and the workers of NREGA part of the rural
poor that Ajay Kumar advocated for.
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We arrive in Atcheyepeta, Ajay Kumar’s village where I spent a couple hours with his
family in his home. His house is a small two room home where Ajay Kumar, his family of 5, and
three dogs live. It’s hard to imagine that this man is able to support his family, provide a college
education to all his children, and run an activist organization with numerous volunteer activists
working for him.
Andhra Pradesh Vyavasaya Vruthidarula Union (APVVU) was created in the 1980’s by
PS Ajay Kumar, founder and activist. The organization describes itself as a federation of union
of agricultural workers, marginal farmers, and other rural workers in the state of Andhra Pradesh.
APVVU activity often involves struggles for land distribution, implementation of land reform
laws, discrimination against untouchability and marginalized community members, and general
protection of rights of the rural poor. This activity includes NREGA work and insuring that the
rural poor have access to entitlements according to the act. The organization is spread over 14
districts in Andhra Pradesh, but coordinates their work with that over other activist organizations
and non-governmental organizations.
After a brief visit and lunch, I leave for Nathavaram, the mandal center village I am set to
live in for the next month. We have arranged for me to spend the first portion of my fieldwork
living with Ajay Kumar’s mother-in-law, Shivalamma, an elderly dalit woman who lives in the
dalit colony of the village. According the Ajay Kumar, this is one of the largest dalit colonies in
the state, and the largest dalit colony in the Vishakhapatnam district. Ajay Kumar is unable to
travel with me to the village, but Shivalamma is also visiting Atcheyepeta, and Ajay sees this as
the perfect time to send her back to her home. Ramlakshmi, or Ram as everyone calls her, is
Ajay Kumar’s eldest daughter. He sends her with me to help me adjust to my work site. We
arrived to Nathavaram that evening and were met by Sunil the next morning.

86

Sunil is a local dalit activists born and raised in the SC colony of the Nathavaram
Mandal. He is up and ready early every morning dressed in worn away button shirts, traveling on
his tarnished bicycle. At a young age he was exposed to the activist work of Ajay Kumar. Sunil
and I had many conversations about how he was inspired to do the work he does. Each and every
time the conversation returned to him wanting to be like Ajay. Sunil described a land struggle
that many BC and SC families had with a Brahmin family. He tells me that after years of being
kept from the land that was rightfully theirs, Ajay Kumar came and started helping them get back
their lands. Sunil says that he was very young and Ajay used to give him some work to do to get
his families land back, and that was when he understood the impact that he could make in his
people’s lives. Sunil works in 10 villages in the Nathavaram Mandal area, however there are 5
villages in particular that he pays specific attention to. He is also involved in the mate training
that APVVU provides to the workers.

Figure 1. This is a picture of Sunil taken during one of our many field visits.
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During one of our many conversations, he began discussing the difficulties he faces as an
activist. In a dialogue of passion, he continues to tell me the full story of his inspiration. “When I
was very little Ajay garu wore a lungi and walked around the village [SC colony]. He used to sit
by the Ambedkar statue and sing songs. People hated it! Then one day the police went after him
for something and the women of the colony hid him where they all went to shower together.
That’s when I wanted to become an activist. To struggle for the people. Now everywhere I go
they treat me like family. They feed me and give me a place to sleep.”
From Sunil we see a demonstration effect. His role as an activist was passed down to him
from Ajay Kumar, an effect of Ajay Kumar demonstrating to Sunil what individuals are capable
of accomplishing despite the struggle they may face. The struggle he endures as a poor dalit man
himself effects his drive to help those who are just as impoverished, if not more, than himself.
Working on the behalf of workers, Sunil mediates their claim to rights, while refusing to take
payment. This is all in an effort to differentiate himself from other intermediates such as brokers.
He makes clear statements in which his refuses to be politically affiliated, distancing himself
from being perceived as a political patron. This is how Sunil sees his role as an activist, an
alternative form of NREGA navigation to the established routes of patronage and brokerage. His
role, however unofficial as it may be, is seen very differently by the workers whom he feels he is
advocating on behalf of, and supporting in their struggle to attain their legal rights.
5.3

Sunil and Workers
When workers encounter problems within the operation of NREGA there are historical

paths of brokerage and patronage they can pursue, as discussed in the previous chapter. With the
introduction of a Sunil like figure, workers now have an alternative path they can utilize to claim
their NREGA entitlements. Sunil’s strength as an activist lies in his ability to work with and
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interact with workers at the ground level. This makes him accessible to workers as needed, an
access they may not have with local government officials and politicians. The relationship
workers have with Sunil is one of respect. Interestingly, there is also a level of demand from the
workers, in which they demand Sunil to help them, with the understanding that this is his job and
he must do what they ask of him. The ease of access workers have to Sunil may be a cause of
this candid relationship.
The adoration that Sunil recognizes and seems to crave is easy to notice when observing
almost any interaction he has with NREGA workers. Ram, Sunil, and I make a trip to the
Chammochintha village on morning, one of the villages of the Nathavaram Mandal. Sunil is
quickly recognized due to his frequent visits. As he navigates the roads of the villages with ease,
he attracts friendly greetings from the villagers by every building he passes. The greetings are
generally tossed in with some inquiry about Sunil’s life. Sunil’s response is followed with a
question about their lives. This interaction is repeated so frequently that I’ve come to understand
it as an orchestrated conversation for the villagers to invite themselves to share their burdens
with Sunil with an expectation for Sunil to help, revealing a reliance on Sunil by the villagers.
Soon after entering this village we arrange a meeting. Everyone who attends the meeting,
even the mates, act less like his equals and friends and more reliant on him as a superior. In
Chammochintha the direct action by workers and reliance on Sunil is clear. When asked what the
villagers would do if there was no change in an issue they were facing, even after they brought
the issue to the attention of officials, they responded that they would approach APVVU or Sunil
and then if no change occurred there was nothing more they could do. Sunil doesn’t jump to
defend this comment. His facial expression tells me that he has heard this type of response
before. With a tired expression, he tells me, “I try to fix as much as I can, but it’s hard to expect
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people to change without me there. They sometimes even don’t change when I am there.” He
was referring to the reliance people have on intermediates such as patron, or on activists such as
himself. Despite the alternative to the exploitative paths Sunil provides workers, allegiance
between patrons and their worker clients persists.
The meeting concluded on an interesting note when I asked everyone what Sunil’s role
was in NREGA and NREGA related problems. They all joke that Sunil is the president of
Nathavaram, but they wish he was the president of their village. Sunil’s face beams with pride
for their comments and he chuckles embarrassed as they speak. They comment on the
transparency Sunil provides, such as sharing important information with them and teaching them
about what they are entitled to in programs like NREGA.
Sunil fulfills the role of clarifying information to villagers. On one occasion Sunil and I
visited Madhavnagar. At a meeting the workers tell me more about Sunil’s role. They said that
he makes these meetings happen, organizing everyone together. He also forms groups, asking
and checking who has a group and job card. Then he helps those without job cards apply for job
cards. Later at this meeting, a man comes up to Sunil and says that he is unable to get a passbook
for his son. Sunil asks if his son has a job card. The man says yes. Sunil asks if his son has done
any work yet. The man says no. Sunil explains that his son will get a passbook when he goes to
collect his first amount. This can only happen after he works at least a week. The man says that
the FA is demanding the passbook. Sunil explains that she has no need for it. He also says that
the man needs to go to her and explain that he knows she doesn’t need that, and that his son can
only get a passbook after working and after a muster is generated by her. The man seems much
more at ease now and says he will try this. In many ways Sunil works to clarify the information
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and support workers make claims to their entitlements. This is one of the main roles he is able to
fulfill, increasing the access to NREGA information by the workers.
During that same meeting in Madhavnagar, the Sunil sat down with mates to file a work
demand for five groups. This demand was then to be taken to the FA. The FA would then fill out
the remainder of the form and turn in the request. The mates submitting the request should also
be given a receipt in return. The mates completed this process before and failed to receive the
work they were demanding. This time they depend on Sunil to help them fill the form out and
approach the FA in their demand for work. Sunil is confident that when they submit this
application today they should receive work within a week. The mates plan on submitting the
request forms tonight. The villagers sit down with Sunil and fill out the demand forms. Below is
a photograph of them completing the forms together.
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Figure 2. Image of Sunil and NREGA workers filling out a demand form together

He is also responsible for organizing trainings within villages, in an effort to equip
workers with the knowledge and tools to understand and navigate NREGA. During these
trainings people were told the rights they should be received through NREGA. They were also
given a measuring tape in a measurement kit, so they could measure how much work was
expected of them that day and measure again at the end of the day to make sure the TA was
measuring properly. A calculator was given to help with payment calculations. Below is an
image of the bag these were given in and the measuring tape and calculator.
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Figure 3. Tools given to NREGA workers by APVVU to measure work done and payments earned.

Each village gets their own bag. If the village is a large one, they may get two bags. I ask Sunil if
the government also gives such trainings and he says they do but their trainings are useless and
half done.
We see that Sunil’s involvement is at many levels of NREGA operation, involving
extensive interaction with workers. He provides clarification and information to workers in an
attempt to increase knowledge and transparency with regards to NREGA. Workers see Sunil as
an alternative path of action to paths involving local patrons and brokers when they are looking
to solve a problem they encounter in relation to NREGA, or to simply access their entitlements.
Interestingly, they approach Sunil not only to solve problems, but for assistance simply
navigating the NREGA system. Sunil has heavy involvement with organizing groups, filling job
demand forms, and job card request forms. Involvement and reliance on Sunil for these tasks
exemplifies his role as mediator between NREGA implementers, government officials, and
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workers. Although the workers themselves interact with government workers, Sunil provides
support and information that workers use in their interactions. He has significant interaction with
workers, but a large portion of his effectiveness as a mediator is in his ability to interact with
government officials on behalf of workers.
5.3.1 Inspiring Activists
Gopi is one of the NREGA mates in G.K. Godam. In one conversation with Gopi, I ask
who Sunil is and what the people in G.K. Godam do when they encounter a problem with
NREGA works. He responds that if it is big issue they go to the peddamanshi in the village, who
was Babu Rao as mentioned in previously. They go to Sunil for problems with NREGA. “Babu
Rao knows nothing of that because he doesn’t do that work,” Gopi says when I ask him why they
don’t go to Babu Rao. He refers to Sunil as the “Mandal Coordinator”, giving him a “official
title” although Sunil really has no official position. Even Sunil introduces himself to others as a
social worker, in an attempt to give himself an “official” title of sorts. In that same conversation
Gopi says that they used to go to Sunil for everything “but now everyone has become like Sunil.”
In a previous NREGA meetings in G.K. Godam, Gopi was the one to tell Sunil there
were no problems. I met Gopi on my first visit to his village, G.K. Godam. Sunil and I meet Gopi
at the front of the village. As he walked up to the village community center he tells Sunil that the
program is working very well here. He says that the “100 days have been going well, even with
money”. He also says that the mates see the work closely. Below is an image of the community
center.
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Figure 4. The village community center of G.K. Godam. Villagers have come together to discuss issues
they are having with NREGA. Sunil has coordinated this meeting.

Soon enough however, workers approach the community center to talk to us about the
problems they are having. One man approaches Sunil and says that his mother is in a different
group that him. He’d like him to be in his group with Gopi. Gopi has made this arrangement, but
she is still not showing up in his group in the system and on the muster rolls. Sunil says maybe
this is a computer issue and he will look into it. Gopi then tells us that women in his group did
not get any money for work. But more shocking is that they disappeared from the muster and
online. This happened to three women in his group. He asks, “how could their names go missing
just like that!?” He repeats that their money went missing and so did their names. He also says
that other groups have been having this problem. Sunil then asks for the names and job card
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numbers of the women so he can go to the Mandal Office and inquire about this issue. Below is
one man whose wife’s name disappeared. He is telling Sunil about his issue.

Figure 5. Sunil discussing how to handle a problem with an NREGA worker.

Others come with problems of missing info. One man comes to Sunil and says that he is
in need of a renewed job card. He has been going to work without a job card. He also says he
went to the FA to ask for a job card, but the FA did not do her job. Sunil jokes that if the FA did
their jobs then there would be no need for some like himself to help out. The members present at
this meeting ask about a woman who is not from this village. Both her ration card, and adhaar
card are from Chammochintha, but she wants to do NREGA work here. They ask how this is
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possible. Sunil asks to see her. She arrives near the end of the meeting. While we wait Sunil says
that she can always change their address on both, but it may take some time.
Gopi mentions again the issue of missing names, and how alarming the missing names
are and demands that Sunil try to get them back. He says the women are staying at home and not
working because they are not being paid. Sunil then asks Gopi why he did not write a RTI letter
for the information. He tells Gopi that he taught him how in training and in this situation that
information is very useful. Gopi just laughs and brushes of the question. He says that he can’t do
anything and that he needs Sunil’s help.
A man named Sathi brings up an issue had by someone named Rajubabu. Gopi also
brings up the issue of a man that has been trying to withdraw money but his finger print has been
failing. Sunil says that he needs to do an eye scan then. Gopi says that they haven’t gotten an eye
scanner yet, so Sunil takes the man’s job card number for his trip to the mandal office. Sunil
turns to Gopi and half-jokingly asks, “What Gopi? You said there were no issues, but everyone is
coming here with them!”
Sunil tells me with pride later that the people of this village are able to handle many tasks
themselves. He tells me that the groups are able to submit the demand forms themselves, without
his help. Although Gopi had originally said there were no issues, when in fact there were many,
Sunil doesn’t seem too upset. In fact, he commends Gopi on the work he is able to accomplish.
He defends Gopi saying that sometimes mates miss information, but mates like Gopi look after
things and if needed they bring issues to Sunil. Gopi says that he was inspired by Sunil to
manage problems for his people. “One day I was talking very angrily with the APO trying to
solve a problem. Sunil came up to me and said that speaking with so much anger was wrong.
Then he told me that there was no need to fear the government. We should only fear them when
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we do something wrong. Since then I’ve tried to solve problems like him. Now if there are
problems people come to me. If I’m busy then Sunil will handle them.”
Similar to how Sunil was inspired by Ajay Kumar, Gopi and other mates and workers
have been inspired by Sunil. This is a role of activism that Sunil takes pride in, but had not
expected. The ability of activists to inspire workers to make demands themselves can be
expected to increase workers’ abilities to place pressure on corrupt low-bureaucratic officials.
They are however, not completely self-sufficient, still reliant on Sunil, as exemplified by this
story. Workers and mates are able to interact with NREGA bureaucracy to make claims to their
rights according to NREGA, but many issues and regular NREGA work is done by Sunil. Sunil
has the most interaction with local bureaucracy. His influence in the government setting is
strengthened by the support and influence he has on workers, who easily outnumber the number
of government officials running NREGA in the mandal, as well as his ability to mobilize workers
when necessary.
5.4

Sunil and Local Bureaucracy
After Sunil encounters and records the NREGA issues, he brings them to the mandal

office of Nathavaram, conveniently located a 5 min walk from the Ambedkar statue at the front
of the SC colony in Nathavaram. Sunil has a recognizable familiarity with the mandal office as
well, exchanging pleasantries with most everyone in and around the office complex. Although he
doesn’t speak openly with the MDO, he talks to the APO as if he is a friend. In fact, the APO is
the classmate of Ajay Kumar’s daughter Ram and fellow activist Balu. This explains to a large
extent the familiarity and friendly nature of Sunil and the APO’s relationship. That being said,
within the NREGA office that the APO manages Sunil has difficulty dealing with the computer
operators. Often the APO and the COs use the same excuse as to why entering or adjusting an
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NREGA worker’s information is delayed. However, Sunil defends the APO’s justification saying
excusing him by accepting that the delay is a combination of bureaucratic issues and technical
issues of the NREGA server. In his frustration with the COs he is quick to roll his eyes at their
excuse, although it may be the same as the APO’s. Rather than accept their excuse he blames any
delays on false “technical issues” saying that this is an excuse that the office workers throw
around when they don’t feel like doing the work.
Sunil’s ability to simultaneously work alongside government officials as well as against
government officials is a defining feature of his role. Sunil and the APO communicate in a
friendly manner. Often when issues arise he calls Nani, the APO, on his cellphone asking for
more information or advice. Despite the friendliness, Sunil is prepared to use collective action
against officials. When the previous MDO was not fulfilling his duties, Sunil organized a dharna
(protest) outside the office forcing the MDO to comply to NREGA policy. When Sunil is
frustrated with COs he shows his frustration, but makes demands in ways he feels is appropriate
but still compelling and forceful. The demand he exhibits in combination with the threat and
power he poses makes him a figure worth paying attention in mandal offices.
His regular presence in these offices also contribute to the familiarity everyone seems to
have with him. Sunil’s understanding of NREGA protocol adds to the seriousness with which
officials interact with him. It is not uncommon for me to see Sunil sitting with COs when I
visited the mandal offices. He would sit to check the all the worker information is entered
correctly into the NREGA system. After each name is entered he would take the necessary
documents and make a Xerox that would function as a makeshift receipt, something that COs are
mandated to give but fail to do. It should be noted that the mundane activity of making copies is
not an expected role of an activists. However, participating in such bureaucratic systems to
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ensure the functioning of NREGA requires that activists such as Sunil participate in some typical
office work. The simple act of making copies for receipts shows exactly how integral Sunil is in
the day-to-day operation of NREGA, both within villages and in NREGA offices. His
involvement reveals just how his integral role is in insuring that NREGA is a functioning
program that follows guideline as described in the operation manual.
5.5

Remaining Apolitical
Sunil’s role relies heavily on mediating discourse between workers and government

officials, but he is not the only such intermediate. Other intermediaries such as brokers and
patrons are also available to help workers approach solving problems with NREGA, as discussed
in the previous chapter. However, methods of claiming NREGA entitlements through patrons
and brokers, often involve some level of exploitation of the worker. Therefore, an important
interaction to explore when understanding Sunil is between him and other intermediaries, the
patrons and brokers. What is interesting is not actually the interactions between Sunil and
intermediaries, but rather the lack of such interactions. Sunil’s interaction with these
intermediaries are minimal. In fact, Sunil avoids such interactions with fear that workers will
begin to associate him with the other intermediate actors. Having such an association would be
problematic, because he aims to provide workers with alternative support.
During one of my conversations with the villagers of G.K Godam I find that many of the
small landowners do not have a patta pusthakam, a book necessary for landowners to receive
low interest loans to buy farming supplies. With the intentions of stressing the importance of
having these books, and pushing the villagers to work together to get these books, Sunil and I are
advised by Gopi to talk to Babu Rao. At first Sunil asks Gopi to call Babu Rao over to Gopi’s
home to discuss here. “Oh no I can’t do that. We have to go to him. I can’t just call him here like
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he’s anybody.” Seeing Gopi’s seriousness regarding this Sunil agrees to go to Babu Rao. We
walk to his compound to find that he isn’t home. His wife tells us that he has gone to the
entrance of the village. This is the normal meeting spot in the village for the men to gather in the
mornings and evening to talk. Gopi says that we should go there and talk to him. Sunil hesitates
saying that it wouldn’t look good to talk to him on the side of the road. Gopi doesn’t understand
Sunil’s hesitation and pushes us to talk to the village entrance. Sunil had hesitated as he was not
sure how respectful he must be around Babu Rao. However, as we approached the village
entrance we see Babu Rao casually sitting on a fallen log brushing his teeth and talking to other
men of the village.
We approach them and Gopi introduces Sunil. The men all stand together and Sunil
introduces the issue. The men nod agreeing that many of them don’t have the book. One of the
men Niadu says he actually has all his documentation. “When Sreenuvas was the VRO people
would give him 200 Rs and he would get it done, but then he was suspended and then nobody
got their patta pusthakam after that,” Naidu says. After he says this Babu Rao chimes in that
Sreenuvas was a useless man taking money unnecessarily. Everyone then agrees with Babu Rao.
All the men get excited as this conversation of the lack of patta pusthakam’s continues. “We
could rent 3 or 4 tata vehicles and stand outside the collector’s office to demand these!” Babu
Rao suggested, the situation escalating to suggestion of direct action. As the heating discussion
wraps up with a consensus that the village needs to compile a list of all the people who do not
have this patta pushthakam. After the group disperses one of the men, Venkatramana, who also
happens to me one of the 6 mates in the village lingers. He turns to Sunil, as Sunil is preparing to
leave back to Nathavaram. “If we just let a party adopt the village they would solve this problem
so quickly. You should bring this up the TDP. Or I’ll bring it up the TDP.” Sunil let’s
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Venkatramana finish then explains that he’ll handle this and there isn’t any need for a political
party to get involved. He then takes this moment to explain to Venkatramana that he doesn’t
work with parties. “I don’t work with parties and I take no payment. We’ll get this done without
them. I’ll take care of this.”
Being affiliate with such intermediaries with ties to local politics may give Sunil a
reputation of being politically affiliated, and as someone who is looking for payment for his
services. This would fail to differentiate him from the intermediaries he is trying to distance
himself from. It is tempting however for Sunil to pursue such connections considering that the
many financial difficulties he faces would be alleviated.
5.6

Difficulties Sunil Faces
Sunil is able to alleviate struggles of the poor he advocates for. Still, he himself is a poor

dalit man with a family to support. The struggles he faces contribute to how he fulfills his duties
as an activist. Financial, caste, and political factors all influence his life, just as they do any other
member of the rural communities he works.
5.6.1 Financial Struggles
Fulfilling this role of activist is not a financially stable occupation. Unlike many activists,
Sunil is paid a salary of 5000 Rs (≈ $73) a month, provided through an AID grant for his activist
work. This salary was also due to end by 2016. Despite the difficulties that can be assumed with
such a small and unstable salary, Sunil tries to mask such financial struggles. I follow him one
day as he is trying to transfer his son to the government school instead of the private school he
was in previously. Although he knows that I understand this is because the government school is
far less costly, he justifies his action saying that his son never liked the private school anyways.
It is also not uncommon for Sunil to disappear for days to take his mother to Visag seeking
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medical treatment. He also is responsible for caring for his daughter and wife. Yet with all the
financial burdens he faces, he rarely mentioned not being able to pay for something. In fact, his
hand was the first to come out with the money for every auto fee or bus ticket we needed. It
wasn’t until I succeeded in beating him to the payment a couple times that he allowed me to pay
for the tickets for the remainder of my trip.
Sunil continually craved affirmation that he was doing well, constantly asking or
expecting me to compliment him on his deeds. Any questions or comments I had, regardless of
how much I coated the comment in compliments, was met with a concerned response of, “so I’m
not doing good…?” In one of the many discussions we had following his regular question of
whether or not he is doing well, the topic of financials arose. In a heated conversation regarding
the need for youth leaders to continue the work Sunil does he exclaimed, “I can’t keep doing this
forever!” Finally, I was able to catch a glimpse of Sunil’s financial concerns and struggles. He
compared the struggle he endured to that of NGOs.
“[NGOs] make money but do so little. I made 200 job cards for Chammochintha and the
villagers wanted to give me 10,000 or 20,000 Rs. I can’t remember exactly how much, but you
know what I said? I said no! I told them to just feed me when I come and treat me like a friend. If
I took money, then what would be the difference between a social worker like me and a
politician? If I did that I would have less struggles. If I did that I’d have a bike instead of this
cycle!” His refusal to acknowledge his financial struggles seems to be a mechanism of coping
with the poverty he and his family live in. It would be easy to begin accepting money offered by
workers he helps, but Sunil must remain strong and refuse any such payment. Portraying he is
not in need of money helps him resist such offers and stops some people from offering.
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5.6.2 Sunil as a Dalit Man
In many ways, Sunil is not bound by the same caste constraints as other dalit members of
the community. However, his caste is still a social limitation. Specifically, it effects his
relationship with workers of higher castes. The best example, is the relationship between Gopi
and Sunil, a friendship and partnership in which the effects of caste differences are clear.
Gopi’s feelings regarding caste were seen in the previous chapter. The relationship
between Sunil and Gopi is also affect by caste differences. While Sunil is a dalit man, Gopi is a
member of the BC caste grouping. In conversation, it is common for Gopi to refer to Sunil’s dalit
community as “your people”, and “my people”. On one occasion I was sitting on Gopi’s porch
talking to him and Sunil. The conversation turned to caste and Gopi says to Sunil, “normally I
say no to your people and don’t relate with them, but you’re a good one. I mean have you seen
the style of your guys, with their long hair and piercings?” he says laughing at how ridiculous he
thinks the style of the dalit youth men is. I look to Sunil expecting him to be upset at this
comment. Surprisingly his expression has remained the same as it was before the comment was
made. The conversation continued to discuss the education of their children and the difficulties
Sunil is having in making his boy more interested in school. I ask Sunil later why he didn’t react
to Gopi’s comment about dalits. “That’s not even the most offensive thing I’ve heard from Gopi.
He’s my friend, and always talks about dalits like that.” Although Sunil’s power as an activist
makes him a more influential figure in among the local bureaucracy, his relationship with Gopi is
one in which he is still seen as a dalit man. The only difference is that to Gopi Sunil was one of
the good dalits. Despite the help that Sunil provided Gopi and the respect Gopi had for Sunil, a
cloud of caste throws a shadow on their relationship.
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5.6.3 Sunil’s Fear of Politics
Politics plays a role in daily life, just as caste and class. For Sunil however, politics is
something he actively avoids. In my last week in G.K. Godam an issue of misuse of funds comes
up. I’m not surprised to hear that someone was claiming money through NREGA that did not
belong to them, but I was surprised to hear that the main coordinator of this scheme was Gopi.
The owner of the house I was staying in had been implying for days that some groups were being
paid more than others. After days of trying to get the whole story out of her, she finally told me
that three of the six groups in the village had claimed to be doing work for three weeks when in
fact they only did one week of work. Curious as to how that was even possible with so many
safeguards in place, I ask her how they were able to do this. She explains that Gopi is a TDP
leader in the village. The FA also happens to be a supporter of the TDP. She also explains that
rumor is he paid her 9000 Rs. to let him do this. 9000 Rs. is far too high for this to even be
feasible for Gopi, however he likely paid the FA some payment he claimed. The members of
Gopi’s group and the workers of the two other groups also gave their payments to their mates. It
would be expected that each worker also received some portion of these payments.
The next morning Sunil comes from Nathavaram to visit me, and I explain the situation
to him. Sunil is also shocked that the mates would be so bold as to claim two weeks’ worth of
payments. “They will definitely be caught when the audit happens,” he says assuring the house
owner. Sunil is also surprised that the main culprit of this issue is Gopi. He asks the owner by
she didn’t bring this issue up to him earlier. This had happened months ago. She explained that
she had assumed Sunil and Gopi were good friends. Sunil assures her that they are just friendly
but they are not friends. He reminds her that he works for all of them. At the same time Sunil
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seems hurt that Gopi did this. He then tells her again that they will be caught at the next social
audit.
Later I ask Sunil why he himself doesn’t expose the issue at the mandal office. It would
be easy to compare the information in the data base to the work actually done at the work site.
Sunil then gets very serious and explains that because this is a political issue he fears what will
happen if he gets involved. “I don’t want to cause problems. I have a family and I don’t want to
get in trouble because of their issue. I also have to consider these things. They’ll be caught at the
next social audit. When the auditor sees that the work done on the site doesn’t match what the
records say they’ll know. If not, I’ll bring it to the auditor’s attention. I can’t take care of this by
myself.” I understood his dilemma. Many actors were involved for this situation to have even
occurred. The FA, TA, and EC had all had to have approved the work both before and after the
work was completed and should have noted that there was a discrepancy between the work
claimed and the work done. Sunil’s fears are one that any individual would have, therefore there
are certain issue that he too feels he cannot handle on his own and must really on auditors for.
Despite his efforts to provide routes of problem solving in NREGA absent of social
constraint to the workers he works on behalf of, Sunil is still victim to such constraints, some
even imposed by the workers he works for. This reinforces why understanding the village
context is crucial for not only understanding why NREGA implementation difference from the
guidelines, and why workers face problems, but also for understanding Sunil’s role and his
experiences with navigating his duties as an activist and dalit man. Social factors of caste and
politics affect relationships of patronage and brokerage, and the relationship between Sunil,
workers, and local bureaucracy.
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5.7

Many Intermediates to Choose from
Both systems of navigating NREGA, through patronage or activists, function

simultaneously, posing options for how workers choose to pursue handling problems or simply
gaining access to their entitlements through NREGA. While Sunil provides a non-exploitative
option, the other paths are notorious for exploiting workers. When Sunil aims to provide a
positive alternative and other systems persist, it is understandable that Sunil harbors frustration
for the other systems and workers who choose access NREGA through them.
On an earlier visit to the village of Chammochintha, I was introduced to the issue of the
elderly man whose wife died at an NREGA field site while doing work. While I was being told
this story for the first time I could not help but notice the concern on Sunil’s face. Sunil has been
involved in this case for over a year now, and the man’s story continuous to make him sad. The
man chose to go to local politician instead of approaching him.
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Figure 6. Image of the woman who died at work site

Many people believe that going to the politicians will get the work done quicker. They
may also have political allegiance, and may continue to benefit from their relationship to the
politician by showing this allegiance in such ways. He believes that he actually does the work
that the politicians say they will and doesn’t charge money, so he doesn’t fully understand why
people like the old man still go to the local politicians. However, he still shows sympathy for the
old man’s situation. He understands that many villagers will be reliant on politicians because that
is how it worked in the past.
This issue arises once more when Sunil and I are vising Nani in his office one afternoon.
Sunil and I wait on the porch of the NREGA offices for 2 hours. A man has come with use to add
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his new wife to his job card. Nani finally arrives and gives me a quick hello as he turns to face
Sunil. He shows Sunil some documents. They discuss a post office payment issue. He just spoke
to the post master who said that they have not received payment yet and that people are thinking
that the post office has the payment money and is not giving it. The man who we had come with
had gone home to grab his own job card. While the man is gone Sunil and the APO take about
the man from Chammochintha whose wife dead at the worksite. The old man had also come to
the APO and when the APO asked for the death report the old man is telling him he gave it to
everyone, meaning all the local politicians. Sunil seems tired of hearing this story again. He says,
“ohh but that’s an old issue”. The APO turns to me and explains that the according to the act the
man should be given 50000 Rs. Sunil then tells me that he and the APO sat and put together all
the documentation into a file that needed to be taken to a legal hearing. Sunil says that he and
APO really struggled at the “ground level” and were ready to get the man his money. The APO
and Sunil seem to have been frustrated with the situation in the past, but now they laugh as they
talk about this, although it still seems as they are masking their frustration. Sunil then says that
after all that struggle the old man went to a political leader and gave the file and the file was lost
and they still haven’t found it again. From then on the man has been bouncing from political
leader to leader.
Although the files are lost and the man will most likely not be able to claim the 50000 Rs.
a year after his wife’s death, Sunil and the APO are now working for the man to at least be able
to withdraw the payment balance of his wife. When his wife died she had earned 2000 Rs. (≈
$29) that had not yet been withdrawn by her. This money has still not been sanctioned to the man
because the man’s finger prints were failing to be recognized as his biometric identifier due to
his participation in regular hard manual labor, so they are arranging for him to get an eye scan
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instead. Sunil tells me that all the documentation is done for this as well, but even when the
needed nominee forms were completed the man took the form and gave it to a local politician.
The APO then jumps in and says that by the time Sunil got a hold of the file it was a little too
late. Although past the set date, the APO was able to push the MDO to accept the document. The
APO then says that he has “faith” that the man will receive payment within 15 days. He then
repeats the word “faith” for emphasis.
Although both the APO and Sunil seem frustrated with the situation, they seem to
somewhat excuse the man’s behavior. The APO says that people like the old man have faith that
politicians can get the work done faster. It seems as though the APO and Sunil have worked
together closely on this case and seems as though the APO is also very interested to hear the
problems bring in so I ask Nani if he and Sunil overlap on issues they hear. He says, “yes!” Not
only do they overlap sometimes but he also says “We share the issues. I tells Sunil issues I hear.
He tells me issues he hears.” Sunil provides a method of claiming right without exploitation, to
Sunil’s frustration old systems of patronage and brokerage persist. Loyalties within patronage
relationships, and expectations of quick results keep worker in such relationship.
5.8

Summary
Sunil has an understanding for workers’ reliance on other intermediaries. He has been

able to form a productive relationship with government officials in an attempt to eliminate the
reliance on patrons, local politicians, and brokers. Sunil’s strength is in his ability to support
workers and NREGA policy, while working with government officials to insure policy is
properly implemented. His influence and reputation among both workers and government
officials is strengthened by his ability to oppose government officials when needed, but also
connect with government officials as necessary. This in combination with his refusal to accept
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payment and absence of political affiliation allow him to represent a non-exploitative alternative
intermediary role, as opposed to brokers and local patrons. Sunil creates a path for workers to
access their rights according to NREGA. The presence of such a path presents workers with a
choice, one they would not have if activists such as Sunil are not present. This choice, in addition
to the support and knowledge they gain from Sunil, has resulted in more vocal, informed, and
empowered workers and citizens. The involvement of Sunil in this process leads me to suggest
that the empowerment expected from rights-based policy such as NREGA is mediated by Sunil,
as he mediates workers’ claims to NREGA entitlements and rights.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion
The rights revolution within India has been shaped by activists and their commitment to
not only the creation of such policy, but its implementation. I examined the understudied role
and influence of activists in the everyday implementation and success of rights-based policy, of
which NREGA is the largest and most ambitious existing program. NREGA was used as a case
through which to study the potentials and limitations of rights-based development and,
specifically, roles of activists. NREGA purports to enable an assertion of rights by the
marginalized poor. In fact, all rights-based legislation has the goal of introducing a rights
dialogue among the marginalized and oppressed. The actualization of this purpose was explored
during this study of activists, revealing that activism is required for the realization of rights.
NREGA aims to extend citizenship to the marginalized and oppressed by giving them the ability
to receive work on their demand, legislating that all citizens of India have an inherent human
right to work.
Historically supported systems of social hierarchy and power dynamics embedded in long
standing systems of patronage function to undermine the social transformative potential of rightbased policy. Such social transformation intended by rights-based policy, assumes that the
marginalized would be able to claim their rights from the state, thereby asserting themselves as
citizens not bound by village power dynamics. Still, such social hierarchies are deeply embedded
in everyday life within the village, as discussed in Chapter 3, and interfere with the actualization
of NREGA’s intentions.
G.K. Godam provides an example of the everyday role of caste, class, and politics and
associated systems of patronage. These confining and rigid systems within a village are
simultaneously supported and combated by NREGA policy. However, before discussion of the
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duality of government enforced rights-based development policy, the considerable cultural and
ideological gap between higher government and local village systems needs to be emphasized.
Such a gap is evident the incongruence of liberal and innovative policies created by the state, and
rigid systems of hierarchies and associated power structures within the Indian village. NREGA is
no exception to such a gap. Whereas NREGA was progressive and adapted from universal
concepts of human rights, contemporary village life is shaped by a historical legacy of indirect
rule and colonialism, resulting in the conservative postcolonial Indian village with deeply
embedded systems of patronage.
6.1

Translation of Rights to Patronage
The stark cultural divide between this higher and lower levels of government place such

economic institutions as NREGA in the hands of local administrators and patrons for use as
currency with workers. A resource with which they can exchange not only for money, but use as
political leverage through clientism. The contradiction of progressive higher level government
and the inflexible systems within the village context persist as systems of patronage continue to
have relevance in the lives of poor villagers. As villagers continue to face barriers and struggles,
discussed in chapter 4, the reliance on patrons and brokers to resolve such issues persists. The
gap is therefore further utilized by patrons and brokers in the everyday practice of NREGA,
reinforcing systems of patronage. The struggles of workers to navigate NREGA, as discussed in
Chapter 4 are both created, utilized, and reinforced by systems of patronage. Such phenomenon
results in the vernacularization of rights based policy. In effect, rights are translated to patronage.
6.2

The Mediation of Citizenship
There appears to be and apparent failure of rights-based policy and accompanying goals

of social transformation of rural India, as rights-based policy is translated to patronage. However,
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Sunil is introduced in Chapter 5 and presents an optimistic alternative to the patronage system,
and demonstrates the successes of NREGA’s social transformation intentions. Rather than
translating the rights framework to one more suited for the village structural norms, activists are
able to translate such brokerage to rights with their role in mediated citizenship. With the
involvement of Sunil as a mediator of citizenship, NREGA is able to fulfill its intended purpose
of providing work on demand. However, his involvement makes the citizenship extended to
workers different than intended – for workers to directly demand from the state without patrons,
or other intermediates such as Sunil involved. Regardless of the type citizenship extended,
workers are able to use Sunil to get work, effectively bypassing the exploitation of patronage.
Therefore, he does provide citizenship, even though this citizenship is dependent on mediation.
The citizenship he provides is actualized by the access he provides to their right to work, the
right to freely demand and receive work as promised to Indians by the NREGA legislation.
Further, he provides workers with an alternative to systems of patronage, giving them a choice
they would not otherwise have.
Sunil has defining characteristics that allow him to function as an intermediary who
mediates citizenship. The sacrifice and struggle he endures as an activist present him as
everything a patron is not. His apolitical stance, contributes even more to this differentiation. In
fact, he actively aims to differentiate himself in such a way, refusing money and resisting
involvement with local politics. In refusing financial assistance for the work he provides, Sunil
makes significant sacrifices to complete his role. This sacrifice contributes to the perception that
Sunil is as not fulfilling his role for a reward, rather for a sense of justice. The sense of justice is
created by his experiences witnessing such injustices happen to those around him, as well as the
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injustices he and his family have experience as a poor dalit family, one of the most oppressed
groups in India.
Another quality of Sunil is his fulfillment of simple bureaucratic roles to insure that the
program is able to function as a vehicle through which workers can attain empowerment and
citizenship. Such everyday bureaucratic work is demonstrative of his ability to work alongside
the government officials; the same government officials he is prepared to work against. This
brings us to the third defining feature of Sunil, his ability to simultaneously work with and
against the state. The relationship his has with state officials at the local level is one in which
they also work with him, recognizing his considerable power and influence. He is able to
function in this role because of such power, a power comparable to the power of local patrons
and brokers. While they have the influence of their clients, their wealth, and their larger
connections, Sunil has the influence of the workers he helps, involvement with the larger activist
network APVVU, NREGA knowledge, and resources that both his activist network and higher
government provide him. This makes him a force worth recognition and gravity within the
NREGA administrative context, one that is capable of working with the officials, but also has the
power, influence, determination to work against them.
6.3

Culture Gaps Between State and Society
The failure of NREGA to accomplish what it intended without Sunil means that the state

is capable of both undermining citizenship as well as promoting it. It promotes citizenship
without consideration of the gap and the extensive patronage systems characterizing villages.
This gap has been created by the incongruence between higher level implementation culture and
lower village level implementation culture. It is largely responsible for the failures and success
associated with NREGA. The state largely failed to consider this cultural divide, only accounting
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for “corruption”, which we’ve uncovered is a broad term with many underlying deeply rooted
causes. Therefore, the creation of such policy gives patrons and local officials yet another
economic resource that can be used to exploit workers and negate any of the policies attempts to
extend citizenships to the marginalized of society it targets. Sunil, however, allows such policy
to function and extend citizenship, while allowing workers to access their legally entitled rights.
He uses the right based policy as a tool to create citizenship. Therefore, the policy can be used by
Sunil as a tool just as it can be used by patrons and brokers as a tool.
The presence of the cultural gap discussed generates the need for an intermediary at the
interface between state and society. The need for intermediaries generates an increased reliance
on systems of patronage. Such reliance is reasonable considering the prevalence and legacy of
systems of patronage and brokerage in rural India. However, the presence of such patrons and
brokers in turn generated the need of activists. While patrons and brokers within NREGA
operation are largely responsible for program failures, activists are able to use the policy to
catalyze social transformation, extending citizenship to the marginalized.
6.4

Limitations of NREGA
Despite the success of NREGA with the involvement of Sunil, it’s hard to ignore the

immense program failures across the country when there are no activists like Sunil. The biggest
problem is that there are not Sunil’s everywhere. Further, there is no strong incentive for new
grassroots activists to arise considering all the struggles activists such as him incur. Gopi’s
fraudulent actions to claim NREGA money, despite Sunil’s efforts to stop such actions,
exemplify a force that is trying to pull back the system of patronage into the operation of
NREGA. Although Sunil provides a functioning alternative to patronage systems, these
patronage systems are trying to reassert themselves in NREGA operation. This presents another
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problem with the implementation of rights-based policy in rural India, the continual resistance to
social transformation.
AP represents in many ways a unique case of positive NREGA outcomes. It’s important
to reflect on the failing status of NREGA programs in other states of India. In AP, activists are
largely able to work against local administration and elected officials. They are able to
confidently do this with the high level of support they receive from high level officials. Support
of AP state leadership has also resulted in general trust by activists of the online system for data,
and the social auditing system. Mainly the social auditing system has been priceless instrument
to activists, one which Sunil has used to avoid to repercussions of opposing embedded political
and patronage systems alone as a dalit man. His use of such NREGA features, which require
higher state involvement, demonstrates some success to the “sandwich” described by
Veeraraghavan and Fox, by which higher level bureaucratic and ground level societal pressures
are able to squeeze the corruption out of lower level bureaucracy (Veeraraghavan, 2015; Fox,
1993).
The resistance of patronage systems to activist mediated citizenship, and the continual
reliance on systems of patronage results in dual systems of NREGA operation. This implies that
there is still significant opportunity and need for improvement. The successes seen with the
involvement of Sunil in NREGA, as well as the cultural divide state and village society brings to
question whether rights-based policy and the successful extension of rights and citizenship to the
marginalized and oppressed of India can ever occur without activist mediation of citizenship.
This potentially calls for widespread activism in order to catalyze the transformations that rightsbased development promises.
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